Quantification of Selection Criteria for Reliability Improvement Warranty Contracts. by Folse, Raymond Otis
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
1977
Quantification of Selection Criteria for Reliability
Improvement Warranty Contracts.
Raymond Otis Folse
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Folse, Raymond Otis, "Quantification of Selection Criteria for Reliability Improvement Warranty Contracts." (1977). LSU Historical
Dissertations and Theses. 3063.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/3063
INFORMATION TO USERS
This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While 
die most advanced technological means to  photograph and reproduce this document 
have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original 
submitted.
The following explanation of techniques is provided to  help you understand 
markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.
1.The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document 
photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to  obtain the missing 
page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. 
This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent 
pages to insure you complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it 
is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have 
moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a 
good image of die page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being 
photographed the photographer followed a definite method in 
"sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper 
left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to 
right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is 
continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until 
complete.
4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, 
however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from 
"photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver 
prints of "photographs" may be ordered a t additional charge by writing 
the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and 
specific pages you wish reproduced.
5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as 
received.
Xerox University Microfilms
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
77-25,380
FOLSE, Raymond Otis, 1936- 
QUANTIFICATION OF SELECTION CRITERIA FOR 
RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT WARRANTY CONTRACTS,
The Louisiana State University and Agricultural 
and Mechanical College, Ph.D., 1977 
Business Administration .
Xerox University Microfilms , Ann A rbor, M ichigan 46106
© 1977
RAYMOND O T I S  F O L S E  
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
QUANTIFICATION OF SELECTION CRITERIA FOR 
RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT WARRANTY CONTRACTS
A DISSERTATION
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
In partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Quantitative Methods
by
Raymond Otis Folse
B.S., Nicholls State University, 1959 
M.A., Louisiana State University» 1963 
May, 1977
EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT
Candidate: Raymond Otis Folse 
Major Field: Quantitative Methods




Major Profenbr and Qralrman
Dean of the Graduate School
EXAMINING COMMITTEE:
Date of Examination: 
— April 18, 1977
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The committee for this dissertation was composed of the follow­
ing members: Dr. William W. Thompson! Jr., Dr. Roger Burford, Dr. Don
Marx, Dr. John Hildebrant, and Dr. Michael H. Peters. Each member 
has patiently provided guidance and assistance while I worked as a 
doctoral student. I thank each individual for this guidance and his 
assistance in the preparation of this dissertation. Dr. Thompson has 
served as chairman throughout my doctoral program. His assistance and 
encouragement were of great value. Drs. Thompson, Burford, and Marx's 
comments on initial drafts of the dissertation were of great value.
I am grateful to each committee member for serving on my dissertation 
committee.
My appreciation is extended to Captain Gerald Brentnall, Major 
Sanford Kozlen and Major Lyle Lockwood of the Air Force Business 
Research Management Center of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base for their 
assistance in obtaining information relative to the dissertation topic.
Special thanks to Mrs. Richard Talbot, who typed the rough 
drafts and to Mrs. Shirley DeJean, who typed the final copy of this 
dissertation.
To my wife, Marlene, and my children, Mignon and Rachelle, my 
heartfelt appreciation for their encouragement and understanding 






LIST OF TABLES........................................... vi
LIST OF FIGURES......................................... vii
ABSTRACT................................................  viii
CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION ..................................... 1
Reliability Improvement .......................  1
Warranties ................................. 2
Life Cycle Costing .........................  6
Problem Statement.............................  10
Justification................................   12
Research Objective and Methodology .............  13
2. ECONOMIC VALUE OF A RELIABILITY WARRANTY .......... 15
Basic Assumptions.............................  15
Life Cycle Cost— The Non-RIW Procurement ........ 17
Number of Units Procured ...................  19
Total Direct Maintenance Cost...............  20
Support Costs ...............................  21
Life Cycle Cost— The RIW Procurement............ 22
Number of Units Procured ...................  22
Cost of the RIW Contract...................  23
The effect of equipment modifications on MTBF 25
Time of modification ...................  27
ill
Average MTBF over .....................  28
Coat of modifications.................... 29
Contractor modification strategy .......... 30
Algorithm to generate T values , ........ 33
rai
Total expected cost of modification . . . .  35
Contractor direct maintenance cost ........ 35
Support Costs ...............................  36
Assessing the Economic Value of a R I W .......... 37
Assumptions..............    38
Input for the Hypothetical Procurements . . . .  39
Results...............................  39
3. DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS.............................  48
Two-Way Discriminant Analysis..................  48
A Monte Carlo Generator of Procurements ........  53
Distributions for Uq and Hq ................  56
Distributions for 6, 6* and T ...............  56P
Distribution of C^, Cy2* CF ^  p .......... ^
Classification into Sample Groups .............. 59
Application of the Discriminant Model . . . . . .  60
Confusion M a t r i x ...........................  61
Discriminatory P o w e r ...............   63
An Interval Cut-Polnt  .....................   64
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................. 65





A. Flow chart of Economic Value of RIW Model..........  74
B. Derivation of the Discriminant M o d e l ..............  79
C. Monte Carlo Generator of Procurements ..............  86
D. Non-RIW and RIW Procurement G r o u p s ................  92
E. Ranked Discriminant Functional Values ..............  109




1. Modification Functional Values ....................  27
2. Cost of Modification.............................. 30
3. Expected Modification Times ...................... 34
4. Parameters for Economic Value Model................  38
5. Data Base for Test C a s e s ............. ...........  40
6. Summary of Output from Model . . ..................  41
7. Summary of Modification Programs ..................  42
8. Key Variables of the Procurement Generator........  55
9. Distribution of the Initial MTBF of a Procurement . . 57
10. Distribution of Unit Prices of Procurement. 59
11. Coefficients of Explanatory Variables ..............  61
12. Confusion Matrix for Sample............   62
13. Population 1 - Procurements Without RIW Contracts . . 93
14. Population 2 - Procurements With RIW Contracts . . .  98




1. Life Cycle Cost versus Reliability ................  7
2. Profit versus Reliability.......................... 8
3. Population Failure Rate versus Age (Bathtub Curve). . 16
4. Modification Value versus Current MTBF ............  26
5. Cost of Modification versus Modification Value . . . .  30
6. Flowchart of Algorithm to Compute Expected Modification
T i m e s .........................................  33
7. Savlng(Loss) vs. Warranty Period Procurement A . . . 43
8. Saving(Loss) vs. Warranty Period Procurement B . . . 44
9. Saving(Loss) vs. Warranty Period Procurement C . . . 45
10. Saving(Loss) vs. Warranty Period Procurement D . . . 46
11. Saving(Loss) vs. Warranty Period Procurement E . . . 47
12. Illustration of the Discriminant Function..........  51




Two models are developed in the study to extend the methodology 
presently available for the selection of equipment to be purchased with 
a Reliability Improvement Warranty (RIW).
The first model determines the economic value of a RIW contract. 
Finding the economic value of a RIW contract involves computing the 
difference between the Life Cycle Cost for the non-RIW alternative 
and the RIW alternative.
The second model utilizes the theory of discriminant analysis 
to judge whether to employ a RIW in a procurement. The data base for 
the necessary population of items is generated by employing the Monte 
Carlo method. Items are separated into the non-RIW or RIW alternative 
subpopulations by using the economic value of a RIW contract model. 
Conclusions drawn from this study are as follows:
1. Three possible approaches result for deciding whether to
employ a RIW contract.
a. Approach one requires the use of the economic value 
model.
b. Approach two requires the use of a linear discriminant 
function to classify items as applicable or not 
applicable for a RIW.
c. Approach three requires the determination of an 
Interval cut-point by applying the linear discriminant 
function found ih approach two. Unclassified items with
viii
discriminant functional values falling outside of the 
interval are classified into their appropriate groups. 
Unclassified items with discriminant functional values 
inside the interval are classified by employing the 
economic value of a RIW model.
The three approaches developed to classify items are 
independent of the avionic industry.
The economic value of a RIW model provides estimates of 
various costs and reliability parameters associated with 
the warranty.
The economic value model can be employed to obtain the 
optimal or most cost-effective warranty period.
The warranty period should be long enough to permit the 
product to reach a state of design stability so that 
specified reliability Improvements can be employed.
The economic value of a RIW model simplifies the task of 
warranty pricing.
The cut-polnt developed in the discriminant analysis model 




In 1968 the United States Navy entered Into the first mili­
tary Reliability Improvement Warranty contract. The United States 
Air Force first applied the concept in 1969. Subsequently various 
branches of the Department of Defense have utilized the Reliability 
Improvement Warranty Contract on a trial basis in approximately ten 
instances. Although the results of some of these contracts are still 
pending it is generally felt that the Reliability Improvement 
Warranty has been effective in increasing reliability and reducing 
repair costs.*
This work deals with an extension of the methodologies 
presently available to the buyer with respect to application of the
Reliability Improvement Warranty concept in the equipment procurement 
2process.
RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT WARRANTY 
An understanding of the concept of the Reliability Improvement 
Warranty (RIW) is dependent upon the concepts of warranties and Life
^Klass, Philip J., "Failure Free Warranty Idea Lauded, Wider 
Use Deserved," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Feb. 9, 1970, p. 57.
2The topic was obtained from the Air Force Research Management 
Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.
1
Cycle Costing. Fundamentally a Reliability Improvement Warranty Is 
a warranty which employs the Life Cycle Costing procurement principle.
Warranties
A warranty Is a device used to protect a buyer from uniden­
tified defects In the supplies or services provided by a seller. At
3the same time the warranty limits the liability of the seller.
In years past, courts seemed to recognize only expressed
warranties— those stated in written or spoken words. Usually these
were-quite limited in coverage and seemed intended to protect the
seller from the buyer's claim. Increasing complaints have led to the
development of legislation to protect the consumer in many areas, one
of which is product reliability. As a result the definition of
warranty coverage has been broadened to encompass the concept of an
"implied warranty." The idea behind this type of warranty is that a
warranty is implicitly intended by the seller even in those cases where
4it is not explicitly stated. The Uniform Commercial Code states that:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has 
reason to know any particular purpose for which the 
goods are required and that the buyer is relying on 
the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish
3Allen, Dennis Jean, "Application of the Reliability Warranty 
to Department of Defense Procurements" (unpublished Master's thesis, 
Navy Postgraduate School, 1975), p. 10.
4The Uniform Commercial Code is used as the basis for tran­
sacting public and private contracts. Because federal law is 
consistent with the Uniform Commercial Code, the Government has 
followed this code in preparing contracts.
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suitable goods, there is, unless excluded or modified 
under the next section, an implied warranty that the 
goods shall be fit for such purpose.
The Air Force has utilized warranties on equipment purchases
since it became a separate service. Traditionally the primary
purpose of a warranty has been to assure correction of latent defects
in purchased items. In recent years warranty clauses are being used
to cover longer periods of time with the goal of achieving a desired
performance level. Problems associated with the enforcement of such
warranties has led to the development of the Reliability Improvement
6Warranty concept.
In 1966 Lear Selgler Inc. proposed to the Navy the first 
RIW contract.^ The first use of this concept in an Air Force 
contract occurred in 1969 between Lear Seigler Inc. and the Air 
Force Systems Command for 128 F-lll A24G-26 displacement gyros.
RIW differs from the general warranty because it goes beyond 
the normal protection against defective or non-conforming equipment. 
It is a contractual arrangement which is employed as a method of 
assuring a given level of reliability. The United States Air Force
5American Law Institute and National Conference of Uniform State 
Laws, Uniform Commercial Code. West Publishing Co., 1972 Official Text,
p. 86.
^Nlxon, Harvey L., Jr. and Christopher B. Hitchcock, "A Simula­
tion of the Reparable Processing Procedures Applicable to Reliability 
Improvement Warranties" (unpublished Master's thesis, School of Systems 
and Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology, 1973), p. 7.
7The first RIW contracts were called "failure free" warranties. 
The term "failure free" warranty proved to be misleading in two ways.
It implied the warranty was free from failure and that the warranty was 
free from cost. Recognizing that it was confusing, it was replaced with 
the term Reliability Improvement Warranty.
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defines RIW as:
...a provision in either a fixed price acquisition,
or a fixed price equipment overhaul contract in which:
a. the contractor is provided with a monetary incentive, 
throughout the period of the warranty, to improve the 
production design and engineering of the equipment
so as to enhance the field/operational reliability 
and maintainability of the system/equipment; and
b. the contractor agrees that, during a specified or 
measured period of use, he will repair or replace 
(within a specified turnaround time) all equip­
ment that fails (subject to specified exclusions, 
if applicable).®
It is important to note initially that a Reliability Improve­
ment Warranty is not a warranty in the classic sense with respect 
to materials and workmanship. RIW differs from the traditional 
warranty in several respects. It calls for the manufacturer to 
replace or repair, at his option, any warranted unit within a 
specified time unit (in operating hours, calendar time or both), 
except in cases of obvious misuse. The contract establishes a 
fixed price for a given level of performance. This price is based 
upon the anticipated number of failures and the cost of each repair 
action. The anticipated number of failures over the warranty period 
are determined by assuming that the reliability of the warranted
gU.S. Department of the Air Force, Interim Guidelines: 
Reliability Improvement Warranty, Washington, D.C., 1974, pp. 5-6.
9U.S. Department of the Air Force, Reliability Improvement 
Warranties Description and Use. Business Research Management Center, 
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, 1974, p. 2.
item will improve from an initial level to some specified level as a
result of the contractor's planned reliability Improvement program.
The philosophy behind RIW is that once the fixed price warranty
contract is established the profit realized by the contractor is
dependent upon the equipment's reliability. Thus contractors are
motivated to focus their attention on the reliability of the items
under contract through the use of "no cost" (to the Government)
9engineering change proposals.
As previously mentioned RIW coverage is described in either 
operating hours, calendar time or both. The use of calendar time 
protects the contractor's obligation in those cases where reliability 
forces the contractor to repair more units than expected. Con­
versely the use of operating hours benefits the Air Force in cases 
where the equipment is not operated as often as expected. Most 
of the contracts issued thus far have used both units of time.^
The nature of RIW requires that administrative procedures be 
efficient. These procedures Include the collection of operational 
and failure times on each Individual unit under contract. Information
9U.S. Department of the Air Force, Reliability Improvement 
Warranties Description and Use. Business Research Management Center, 
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, 1974, p. 2.
10U.S. Department of the Air Force, Interim Guidelines: 
Reliability Improvement Warranty. Washington, D.C, 1974, p. 16.
of this type is required so that the buyer and seller nay communicate 
the terms of the contract.
Life Cycle Coating
Since early 1961 a continuous effort has been maintained by 
various manufacturers of military equipment to show to the Depart­
ment of Defense that the "low Initial price" procurement criteria was 
more often than not the most expensive way to buy. As an alternative 
to the "low Initial price" procurement these manufacturers developed 
the concept of Life Cycle Costing. Life Cycle Costing is defined 
as a procurement technique having as its objective the making of 
competitive awards of military contracts on the basis of lowest 
total cost of ownership to the Government. The total Life Cycle 
Cost or total cost of ownership is defined to include operating, 
maintenance, and other costs as well as the cost of acquisition.^ 
Studies have revealed certain relationships between Life 
Cycle Cost and reliability. Throughout this paper the measure of 
effectiveness for "reliability" will be expressed in terms of 
"Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF).11 It is expected in general that 
Life Cycle Cost will vary inversely with reliability (MTBF). Figure 1 
illustrates this relationship. For most complex equipment, as 
reliability increases the Life Cycle Cost decreases due to the 
reduction of maintenance cost. It should be noted that there exists
**Markowitz, Oscar, "When Purchasing and Design Look to 
Total Costs," Purchasing Magazine. June, 1970, pp. 65-69.
a point where the Life Cycle Cost will begin to increase again as







Life Cycle Cost Versus Reliability
For most Air Force equipment the procurement objective is to 
obtain more reliable products from vendors. Unfortunately the 
strategy of the seller opposes the strategy of the buyer. Balaban 
and Retterer concluded:
12Dunn, Payton E. and Andrew A. Oltyan, "Evaluation of 
Proposed Criteria to Be Used in the Selection of Candidates for 
Reliability Improvement Warranties" (unpublished Master's thesis, 
School of System and Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology, 
1975), p. 5.
8
Today’s procurement practice, with the emphasis on low 
initial purchase price, causes vendors to supply the 
lowest reliability that will pass the procurement 
acceptance requirements. The vendor is economically 
driven to this position, hi|2®axi®urn profit being 
derived from such strategy.







To illustrate the fundamentals of an RIW contract let us 
consider the basics of the first contract between Lear Seigler Inc. 
and the U.S. Navy in 1967. The contract involved a fixed price to
13Balaban, Harold S. and Bernard L. Retterer, "The Use of 
Warranties for Defense Avionics Procurement," The ARINC Research 
Corporation Report 0637-02-1-243, The ARINC Research Corporation, 
Annapolis, Maryland, June, 1973, p. 4.
cover all the overhauls required on a long term field operating period
for the CN-494A/AJB-3 gyroscope platform. Historically this gyro
platform was an Item with a high failure rate. The manufacturer
contended that he could Improve the mean time between failures for the
gyros if he were allowed to remain responsible for their overhaul over
the long term. After considerable negotiation a contract was
established as a 3,000 hour field operational warranty over a period
of 5 years on 800 gyroscopes. The fixed price was based on a 30
percent improvement of reliability or a return of 2,400 failures to
Lear Selgler Inc. over the contract period and an average overhaul
cost of $1,000 per failure. As in all RIW contracts the contractor
is motivated to increase reliability beyond that which was negotiated
since every failure under 2,400 implies $1,000 less he will have to
spend. In addition the risk of more than 2,400 failures occurring
forces the contractor to monitor his reliability Improvement program
to meet the goals determined by the contract. The Department of
Defense benefits because It has reduced Its repair cost of the
particular item over the contract period and ends up with a more
reliable piece of equipment. In the case of the gyro platform the
government saved approximately $1,046,000 in Life Cycle Cost while
increasing MTBF above the 30 percent specified improvement. Thus
the RIW contract reduced the cost per operational hour of the gyro
14over the contract period.
14Markowitz, Oscar, "Life Cycle Costing Applied to the Procure­
ment of Aircraft Spare Parts" (unpublished Master's thesis, Drexel 
University, Philadelphia, Pa., May, 1971), pp. 50-51.
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A RIW provision may be introduced during initial design and 
production or even after procurement by the Government. The rule of 
Introduction for RIW is the earlier the better during the procurement 
cycle. Obtaining contractor involvement during the initial stages is 
important because equipment generally undergoes a reliability growth 
process from the time of initial design until it reaches a state of 
maturity.^ Insuring contractor Involvement at the earliest possible 
stage theoretically accelerates reliability growth and minimizes the 
cost to achieve it. Thus when the purchaser takes over the risk and 
reliability of the equipment upon expiration of the warranty, they 
will hopefully be in an optimal position.
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The question of whether to apply the RIW in the procurement 
of an item is of utmost importance to the Department of Defense.
On dispensable items it is of little value, but on other items it 
has tremendous value. This leads to the discussion of whether or 
not there is a break even point or under what conditions does it 
become useful to use a RIW contract. At present the methodology to 
use in making this decision is Incomplete. Therefore it is proposed 
that a model be developed which will provide the procurement officer 
with a solution to this problem.
The current selection process requires that potential RIW 
candidates satisfy a set of application guidelines. Given below
^Balaban and Retterer, op. cit., p. 16.
is a list of the guidelines.^
a. Units should be field-testable to avoid return of good 
units.
b. Units should be readily transportable.
c. Units should be self-contained and not dependent on
auxiliary equipment.
d. Units should be sealed to avoid tampering.
e. Units should lend themselves to serial number management.
f. Moderate to high support costB should be Involved.
g. Knowledge.concerning the application of the unit in terms
of expected operating time and the use environment should 
be available.
h. Units should have the potential for both reliability 
growth and the reduction in repair costs.
1. A sufficient quantity should be purchased to make RIW 
cost effective.
j. Units should have a reasonably high utilization level.
These guidelines serve as qualitative and quantitative con­
ditions for application. Guidelines (a) through (e) are qualitative 
while guidelines (f) through (j) are quantitative in nature. Items 
do not have to satisfy all of the above guidelines in order to
qualify for RIW application. The merits of an item relative to certain
guidelines may be used to compensate for its weakness with respect to 
other guidelines.
16Nixon and Hitchcock, op. cit., p. 4.
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The procurement officer must first determine if the potential 
Item for RIW application adequately satisfies the stated qualitative 
guidelines. Next he must determine on the basis of the quantitative 
guidelines whether or not a RIW procurement is in the long run 
economically attractive. Guidelines (f) through (j) are not adequate 
criteria to answer this question. It is here that the heart of the 
problem centers.
JUSTIFICATION
Inflation and a dwindling defense budget have prompted the 
Department of Defense to search for ways to reduce costs while main­
taining a strong defense.^ One approach is to attempt to reduce 
the cost of the maintenance of equipment. This type of expenditure 
is a function of the reliability of equipment.
Improving reliability serves as a means of reducing the cost
of maintenance. In those cases applicable the RIW contract represents
an investment which has as its goal the reduction of maintenance
18cost. A study by the Logistics Management Institute on four air­
craft system case studies demonstrated that an additional investment of 
7.8% on reliability improvement programs could reflect a net savings
17U.S. Department of the Navy, Proceedings at Failure Free 
Warranty Seminar. Dec. 12-13, 1973 (Philadelphia: U.S. Navy Aviation
Supply Office, 1973), p. N-17.
18Logistics Management Institute, "Criteria for Evaluating 
Weapon System Reliability, Availability and Costs," LMI Task No. 73-11, 
Logistics Management Institute, Washington, D.C., March 1974, pp. 70-71.
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of 27% In total cost. It is this type of return on investments that the 
Department of Defense needs in order to resolve the effects of infla­
tion and a dwindling defense budget. Thus it is important that the 
methodology of when to apply a RIW be developed.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY 
The objective of this study is to extend the framework now 
available to the United States Air Force in determining whether to apply 
a Reliability Improvement Warranty for a specific item. The approach 
used to extend this framework is dependent upon two different 
procedures for classifying a piece of military equipment as applicable 
or not applicable for a RIW contract.
Approach number one involves defining a model for computing 
the economic value of a RIW contract as the difference between the 
Life Cycle Cost for a non-RIW procurement and the Life Cycle Cost for 
a RIW procurement. A non-negative economic value classifies an item 
as appropriate for a RIW contract while a negative economic value 
classifies the item as being not appropriate for such a RIW contract.
The second approach employs the multivariate statistical 
technique of discriminant analysis with respect to classifying items 
as RIW applicable or not. In order to apply this statistical classifi­
cation technique a history of measures on key variables taken from a 
population of items which have been classified in either the RIW or 
non-RIW category must be known. Because the data base with respect 
to RIW applications is small due to the limited number of applications 
to date the following steps will be carried out to complete this 
model.
14
1. The Monte Carlo technique will be applied to generate 
a multivariate population of measures to represent a 
collection of hypothetical items for potential RIW 
application.
2. The economic value of a RIW model will be applied to 
the population generated in step 1 in order to classify 
each into the applicable or non-applicable for RIW 
subpopulations.
3. The discriminant analysis model is then applied to
i
the two subpopulations of multivariate measures to 
obtain the necessary quantitative criteria for 
classifying equipment procurements as applicable 
or non-applicable for RIW contracts.
A limitation in both analytical approaches to the problem is 
that only approximately 10 RIW contracts have been executed within the 
Department of Defense. In view of this limited use of the RIW, any 
framework developed will have to await the future generation of data 
to be adequately tested. Despite this limitation the need for such 
a framework exists.
CHAPTER 2
ECONOMIC VALUE OF A RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT WARRANTY
Even though RIW contracts offer a potential benefit to users, 
they are not applicable in every military procurement. Thus it is 
necessary that the procurement officer be able to determine whether 
a RIW is economically attractive for a particular item. In this study 
the economic value of a RIW contract is the saving (loss) of a RIW 
contract found by determining the difference between' the Life Cycle 
Cost for the item procured without a RIW and the Life Cycle Cost for
the item with a RIW, where both are measured over the given warranty
period.
BASIC ASSUMPTIONS 
In the development of the economic value model it is assumed
that the item under consideration for a RIW contract has passed the
qualitative guidelines for application mentioned in Chapter 1. 
Furthermore the economic value obtained from the model is to serve 
as a basis for determining if the quantitative guidelines given in 
Chapter 1 have been satisfied.
Two of the most noted issues in the mathematical theory of 
reliability are: (1) the choice of the distribution of failures;
and (2) the assumption of independence of failures.^
^Logistic Management Institute, "Criteria for Evaluating Weapon 
System Reliability, Availability and Costs," LMI Task No. 73-111, 
Logistics Management Institute, Washington, D.C., March 1974, p. 21.
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One popular relationship between failure and equipment life is 
referred to as the bathtub curve. The bathtub curve given in the 
figure that follows plots the failure rate against the lifetime of 
the population of units purchased. The failure rate is initially high 
due to early failure, then it drops to become constant, and finally 
rises due to wearout failures. The flat portion of the bathtub curve, 
which represents the constant failure rate, makes up a major part of 
the curve. For our purpose it is reasonable to assume a constant 
failure rate initally. Early failure and wearout periods are ignored. 
This is logical in that the usual warranty (implied or expressed) 
obtained upon purchase of the item generally covers the early failures 













Population Failure Rate versus Age (Bathtub Curve)
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To simulate the constant failure rate portion of the bathtub 
curve the Polsson distribution Is used. This distribution leads to a 
simple negative exponential expression for the probability of a failure 
occurring as a function of time. The basic assumptions necessary for 
the use of the Polsson distribution are (1) that time may be divided 
into sufficiently small intervals so that the probability of two 
events in one Interval of time is zero; and (2) that the probability 
of one event in any interval is a constant times the length of the 
interval and is independent of the other intervals. These assumptions 
seem reasonable in the context of this study.
The reciprocal of the failure rate is the mean time between 
failures. Thus if it is the constant failure rate, then the MTBF is 
1/tt. Throughout most of the study, MTBF will be used rather than 
the failure rate since it is the more convenient in expressing the 
reliability of a device.
LIFE CYCLE COST— THE NON-RIW PROCUREMENT 
The total Life Cycle Cost for a non-RXW procurement is the sum 
of all quantifiable costs associated with the procurement over a 
specific period of time. In order to compare the total Life Cycle 
Costs for the non-RIW and the RIW procurement, the time period of 
the warranty will be used as the period of measurement of costs in 
both cases. It is assumed that the length of the warranty period 
chosen for the RIW contract is such that it is less than the lifetime 
of the procured equipment.
The three major cost elements considered in the definition of 
the total Life Cycle Cost for the non-RIW procurement are the cost of
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the acquisition of the equipment, the direct costs with respect to 
maintenance of failures and the indirect costs associated with main­
tenance support. Total Life Cycle Cost is a function of the length 
of the warranty period. Because of this all cost components of the 
total Life Cycle Cost which represent an investment of owner dollars 
over time must be amortized to provide a fair comparison with respect 
to varying warranty periods. In this study investment dollars will 
be amortized on a straight-line basis.
Given below is the total Life Cycle Cost model for the non- 
RIW procurement alternative:
LCC1 < V  -  " f t  + CDM1 +  CIS1AM + CRS1TW (1>
where
LCC^(T^) ■ total life cycle cost measured over (0,T^) for 
a non-RIW procurement!
Tw ■ warranty period in months»
■ number of units purchased,
P ■* purchase price of each unit*
Ajj ■ amortization factor ■ T^/T^,
* lifetime of equipment in months,
CDM1 * direct maintenance cost to the purchaser during the 
warranty period,
CIgl - initial support cost to the purchaser,
and
Cgg^ “ recurring maintenance support costs per month.
Details of each component in the function LCC^ are given in the 
sections which follow.
Number of Units Procured
For either procurement alternative the number of units procured
is the sum of the number of operational units and the number of spares
that will be required. Let U represent the number of units procured,
Uq be the number of operational units and Ug be the number of spares.
Then U - U + U .o s
There are many factors required in determining the number 
of spares Ufl to be purchased. For example, some of the factors are 
the design of the pipeline used in repairing failures, the failure 
rate, the rate of repair and the geographic distribution of units 
among military bases. To simplify this matter the number of spares 
will be computed in terms of the number of items in the repair system. 
This value may be found by applying the following basic queueing
2theory formula for a single server system with Polsson failures.
E(Q) - E(q)Tp (2)
where
E(Q) ■ expected number in the repair facility,
E(n) ■ expected number of failures per month,
and
Tp “ expected time each failure spends in the system 
measured in months.
Now we can determine the expected number of failures per 
month by E(n) ■ (UoHo)/0e where Uq ■ the number of operational units,
2Taha, Hamdy A., Operations Research: An Introduction. (New 
York: The MacMillian Co., 1971), p. 507.
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Hq ■ the average number of hours a unit operates In a month and 0g
■ the estimated average MTBF of a unit over the warranty period.
Next assign to Tp the average time spent by each failure in
the pipeline measured in months. Hence, the equation for defining
the number of spares required for an average level of service may
be written as follows:
U = E(Q)
U = E(n) T s p
U H T
U = °̂ ° P (3)3 ?e
For the purchase without a RIW contract it is assumed that the 
MTBF is equal to its initial reliability, 9̂ , throughout the warranty 
period. If 0g is replaced with 9^ in equation (3) the total number 
of spares required for an average level of service for the non-RIW 
case is
uci "51 O O P 1
Thus the total number of units procured in this case is
U- = U + (U H T )/6 (5)1 o o o p I
Total Direct Maintenance Cost
In the case where the item is purchased without a RIW contract
the owner incurs all the cost of failures. These costs are reflected
in the total direct maintenance cost C-.., which represents the sum ofDM1
all direct costs associated with repairing failed equipment. These 
costs include expenses relative to the removal/replacement, shipping, 
testing and repairing of failed items.
21
The total direct maintenance cost can be estimated by
multiplying the expected number of failures over the warranty period 
times the average cost per failure. The equation below defines
CDM1 as:
^DMl ™ (Expected Number of Failures) x (Average Cost per Failure)
where
and
<Do H o V V  c n
W o V ' 8! (6>
UQ ■ the numbed of operational units,
■ initial or constant MTBF over the warranty period, 
CFj“ cost per failed unit,
Hq ™ average number of hours a unit operates in a month,
Ty ** length of the RIW contract in months.
Support Costs
As in the case of moBt procurements the purchaser incurs both 
initial and support costs in the non-RIW case. The initial support 
cost includes the cost of test equipment, manuals, training, etc.
The monthly recurring support cost includes items such as admin­
istrative costs and preventative maintenance costs. Since the 
initial support cost represents an investment it is given as an 
amortized item in equation (1).
LIFE CYCLE COST— THE RIW PROCUREMENT 
The major cost components of the total Life Cycle Cost for the 
procurement of equipment with a RIW contract are the initial acquisition 
costs of equipment, the costs of the warranty coverage, the direct 
costs associated with failures, and the indirect costs relative to 
maintenance support. Given below is the total life cycle cost model 
for the RIW procurement alternative.
LCC2(V  - U2PAM + °RIW + CDM2 + CIS2AH + CRS2TW <7>
where..
LCC2(TW) * total life cycle cost measured over (0, T^) for 
a procurement with a RIW contract,
Ty ■ warranty period in months,
U2 " number of units purchased,
P « purchase price of each unit,
■ amortization factor ■
T_ " lifetime of equipment in months,
° Total cost of RIW contract,
Cp^2 “ direct maintenance support cost to the owner,
C^g2 “ initial support cost to the owner,
and
Crs2 ■ recurring maintenance support costs per month.
Details of each component of the function LCCj are given in the 
sections that follow.
Number of Units Procured
The number of units U2 purchased by the military in a RIW 
procurement is U2 • Uq + Ug2» where Uq ■ the required number of
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operational units and “ the number of spares. An estimate of 0̂ , 
the average MTBF of a unit during the warranty period, Is required 
to determine the number of spares Ugg* is known that the MTBF of 
the equipment has an Initial value of 6^ and each contract is 
negotiated to motivate the contractor to bring the equipment up to 
at least a specified MTBF of 6* by the end of the warranty period.
It Is thus reasonable to define 0 “ (0. + 0*)/2. By using thisc  X
estimate of 6e and equation (3) we have
U«!9 “ (u « T ) /? (8)S2 o o p e
where
Uq * the number of operational units,
Hq * average number of hours a unit operates per month,
and
- average time each failure spends in the repair pipeline 
measured in months.
Thus the value of becomes
-  Uo +  < V o V /? « (9)
Cost of the RIW Contract
As mentioned in Chapter 1 each RIW contract involves a fixed 
price which must be negotiated between the user and the contractor.
The negotiated price includes the expected direct maintenance cost 
of the contractor. The expected direct maintenance cost of the 
contractor is dependent upon the anticipated number of failures during 
the warranty period and the cost of each repair action. Once the 
expected direct maintenance cost of the contractor and the cost of
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equipment modifications resulting from the reliability program have 
been agreed upon, the contractor applies a risk factor and a profit 
factor to arrive at the contract price.
The contractor faces risk and uncertainty when he engages 
into an RIW contract. The risk and uncertainty increases as the 
length of the warranty increases. One risk function utilized by 
contractors to compensate for this fact isV12R(TW) = (1 + r) W (10)
where
3r is the annual rate of risk.
Given below is an equation for estimating the total cost of 
employing a RIW contract for items for the warranty period.
CRIW ■ {CM0D + W R<V + X/1°°>
where
CL,.,.,, ■ total cost of the RIW contract,RIW
= total expected modification cost of the contractor, 
R(TW>= risk factor,
and
X = percent profit of the contractor
The subtopics which follow develop the models to determine the
total expected modification cost C„„„ and the total direct maintenanceNOD
cost to the contractor C-™.DNL
3Balaban, Harold S. and Bernard L. Retterer, "The Use of 
Warranties for Defense Avionics Procurement," The ARINC Research Corpor­
ation Report 0637-02-1-243, The ARINC Research Corporation, Annapolis, 
Maryland, June, 1973, p. 101.
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The effect of equipment modifications on MTBF. Modifications of equip­
ment under a RIW are made through the use of engineering change 
proposals. Each engineering change proposal is designed to improve
the current MTBF by a factor of M. Namely, if 0mr. is the currentOLD
MTBF, then the new MTBF Q,— .. ■ M x 0_._- Within the lifetime of aNEW OLD
RIW contract a finite number of modifications may be Implemented to 
cause the initial MTBF to approach a specified MTBF, which was 
agreed upon in the contract negotiations. Thus a technique must be 
found to determine the improvement factor M defined by each modification.
The value of each M is bounded such that M >_1 but M < M', 
where M' is an upper bound for all such modifications pertaining 
to the particular unit. Furthermore the value of each M is dependent 
upon 9* the specified MTBF the contractor must try to reach with 
each modification and upon 9 the current MTBF of the population of 
items procured.
One such function that is consistent with these assumptions is 
M(0) - M* + (1 - M ') (12)
where
M* “ the Improvement factor expected if 0 - 9*.
This function is a form of the Pearl-Reed curve often used in
4economic growth models. Balaban and Retterer used a similar form of
4Ibid.. p. 93.
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Modification Value versus Current MTBF
It should be noted that Jim M(0) « 1 since "  + 0 as 0 •> ®.




\M '“L  I
/ M'-M* \
V*'-1 )
Q*< 1 and —  0
0
+ ■ as 0 + 0
0*
0 0. Furthermore it is seen
that M(0*) - M*.
A numerical example is considered to demonstrate the nature of 
the function M. Let the initial MTBF be 50 hours, the specified 
MTBF be 111 hours, M* ■ 4 and M* ■ 1.3. For these values the 
modification function is






Table 1 that follows Indicates the values of M and the new
MTBF 0„_ after each modification Is employed. Two modifications are NEW
required for Sjjjgy to become greater than or equal to the specified 
MTBF of 111 hours.
Table 1
Modification Functional Values
Modification e M(0) 9 n e w  "  11x0
1 5 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 . 6 2 5 7 8 1 . 2 8 3 9
2 8 1 . 2 8 3 9 1 . 4 0 2 0 1 1 3 . 9 8 1 8
Time of modification. The time at which a modification can be
introduced is a random variable T . It is reasonable to assumem
that modifications will not occur before some minimum time T hasa
occurred after procurement of the units or after a previous modifica­
tion has been employed. One distribution that can be used to define 
Tm is the negative exponential distribution defined by
f (T )"de~d T̂m""'I'â  for T > T . The constant d represents the rate of m m a
modification.
The cumulative distribution function F is defined as
F(T) - P(T < T) - l-e“d ̂ a T ^ f o r  T < T < T. (13)m —  a m —
Assume that a certain procurement results in n-modlficatlons with
values M., M„, ..., M . Each modification occurs at some time T .l i n m
The times between modifications are restricted in that each
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modification occurs only after some time T has occurred. Thus if
^modifications are involved then the times of each are ordered as
0 < T < T < T < T <... < T  < T < T . a, m, a» m. a m w1 1  t L n n
Given that a modification occurs on some time interval
(T , T»). then the expected time of such a modification can be a p
obtained by employing basic principles of probability theory.
fTs■'T T f (T )dT
E(TJ  V V V  " F(T ) - F(T ) *p a
" /t3 Tm f(Tm)dTm * (1 ' e~d(W ) .X m
1 (Tfl “ V  «~d(TE~ Ta>- T + T  B-T tS ------- • (14)d 1-e 8 Tot)
Let T denote the expected modification time given by equation m
(14). The formula above will be employed on several occasions in 
the development of the model.
Average MTBF over T^. The average MTBF of the equipment over the
warranty period represents another important measure. If we assume
that n-modiflcations occur respectively, at times T , T , ..., T ,ra, m. m
  f *"} 1 (' 2 ■) nthen the MTBF varies from Bn over 0 T > to 0. over T , T , to
0 L mlJ-. 1 L rai a2_l
62 over T . T  I. .... to fi over i T .T 1. The values of the
L m2 msJ   n t -niT™ *T I- L  WJ
modification times T , T , ..., T can be estimated by employing
ml m2 _  “n
equation (14) which defines T .m
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Thus an estimate for the average MTBF 9 Is defined as
9 (T ) 6,(1 - T ) 9 (T - T )  o m. I m, m. n w m
6 - ---^ + ... + ----------------r-̂ -- —  (15)
w w w
Cost of modifications. This is a difficult cost to predict. Studies
have shown that in general the greater the reliability improvement the
higher the cost. Certainly there are instances where high reliability
improvement has resulted from a low cost modification while a low
reliability improvement has resulted from a high cost of modification.
In general the cost of modification is an increasing function of M
and this assumption will be used.
A study by Mercurlo and Skaggs^ utilized multiple regression
analysis to obtain the cost of reliability Improvement in terms of
the resultant MTBF and the quantity of parts in the item modified.
Balaban and Retterer^ in their study utilized a cost function in
terms of the item modified. The cost function adopted in this study
is essentially the same as Balaban and Retterer's except the cost is
defined in terms of the amount of modification to increase the MTBF
of the item. The function is denoted and defined as
C(M) - 1.06(exp [(M-1)/10M] - 1)P (16)
where
P - the purchase price of the item 
and 1 < M < M \
5Mercurio, Salvotore P. and Clyde W. Skaggs* "Reliability 
Acquisition Cost Study*" General Electric Company Report RADC-TR-73-334, 
Rome Air Development Center* Griffin Air Force Base* New York*
November 1973* p. 27.
^Balaban and Retterer* op. cit.* p. 95.
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Presented below are the costs associated with the modifications 













Cost of Modification versus Modification Value
Contractor modification strategy. The strategy utilized by the 
contractor in determining whether a modification to improve reliability
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is to be attempted during the warranty period Is next considered.
It is assumed that the contractor implements a modification of
7equipment if it is profitable to do so.
The decision rule is to establish the modification if the 
cost to produce the modification is less than the saving established 
from increasing the current MTBF from 0 to M^0 or reducing the 
failure rate from ir to ir/M̂ . The saving obtained from the modifica­
tion is determined by finding the difference between the contractor 
cost of maintenance for the current failure rate it and the Improved
failure rate tt/M. over the period of time from T to T .1 w
The contractor cost of maintenance with a failure rate it over
the interval (T , T ) is m^ w
ci - cfV < V \ )ho (17>
where
Cp ■ the cost per failure,
Uq ■ the number of operational units, 
ir - the current failure rate in failures/hour,
Hq “ the number of operational hours of the equipment/month, 
■ warranty period in months,
and
■i time of modification in months.
If at time T the contractor makes the appropriate equipment 
mi
modification the failure rate reduces to tf/Mj while the cost of
7Balaban and Retterer, op. cit., p. 97.
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failures over the period T to T becomesw
C- - C_U (tt/M ) (T - T ) H (18)z t o  l w m^ o
Thus the expected savings is
Cn - C - C_U (1 - 1/M.)ir(T - T ) H (19)1 i t o 1 w o
The contractor's strategy is to apply the modification at
time T if it is profitable. Namely, the modification of value M. m^ i
is applied if its total cost is less than or equal to the savings it
produces. If C(M^) represents the cost of modifying one unit, then 
the total cost of modifying units is UjXt^M^). The inequality 
below represents the decision rule to use when applying a modification.
V (Mi) i W 1 - ̂  ”(Tv - <20)
The above Inequality is important because it will lead us to
a time T. to act as an upper bound for T . Solving the inequality l m^
for T yields 
mi1 U,C(M )
Tm -  Tw " U (1 - 1/M )irC H (21)1 O 1 r O
Defining
Ti " Tw ” D (1 - 1/M ).C H <22)o i F o
produces an upper bound for T . Since the two preceding inequalities
“i
are logically equivalent, then we can apply the contractor's decision
rule equivalently by noting whether or not the value obtained for
is bigger than the minimum time to the next modification T . The
ai
latter is true because T exists provided T < T « T.. Namely,nit ct. n. 11 1 1
it is profitable to apply the modification with value if
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T < T\ since It implies the existence of a T between T and T .. aA 1 a4 1
Algorithm to generate T values. Assume It is known that the k-  % ------
modifications are required to Improve the reliability of the equipment
such that the MTBF of the equipment is greater than or equal to the
specified MTBF of the contract. It must be decided whether the
modifications are profitable.
Let T . represent the minimum amount of time that must elapse min
prior to the first modification or the amount of time that must elapse 
between successive modifications. A flowchart of the basic algorithm 
for determining the expected modification times for k potential 













Flowchart of Algorithm to Compute 
Expected Modification Times
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Assume an RIW contract is in effect. It is now helpful to
follow the logic of the Algorithm. The value of i is set to 1. Next
is computed with it equal to the initial failure rate of the item.
The value of T. is compared to T , to determine if a modification of
1
value M^ is profitable.
If T < T,, then the modification is profitable. Since T, l 1
must fall within the warranty period we must Insure that T^ <_ T̂ .
If it is found that T < T_, but T, > T p then let T, ■ T . Thus1* 1 w 1 w
we find in either case Tq < T^ <_ By employing the formula for the
expected modification time the value of T , can be found. The algorithm
®1
continues until i « k.
It ?a ~ then the modification is deemed unprofitable and
no other modifications are considered during the course of the warranty 
period.
Table 3 that follows indicates the corresponding values of Tffl
for the values of found in Table 1. For the determination of the
entries in Table 3 assume T . - 3 months, T - 60 months, T_ ■ 120min w l
months, U. - 1040 units, U * 1000 units, H - 25 hours/ month, C_ “ Z O O  F
$120 per failure and d 91 .070.
Table 3 
Expected Modification Times
Modification M. T T. T1 l a
1
2
1.6257 3.00 41.27 14.47
1.4020 17.47 29.70 22.72
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Total expected cost of modification. If It Is found that k-modifica- 
tions are profitable, then the total cost of these modifications can 
be found by employing the formula
The contractor typically will incur modification costs at time T
mi
If we assume the estimated modification costs are included by the 
contractor in the price of the RIW contract and the military pays the 
contract price at time 0, the contractor normally discounts these 
costs. The formula that follows determines the total cost of all the 
modifications by discounting and amortizing each C(M^)
Contractor direct maintenance cost. The contractor incurs a total
direct maintenance cost C_ur, because the terms of the RIW contract makeDHL
him responsible for failures. This cost is determined by applying 
the same formula utilized to compute the user direct maintenance cost 
^DMl w*-t*1 t*ie cost per failure Cp, designating the contractor's cost 
per failure and 6 set equal to the expected MTBF over the warranty 
period. In general the efficiency of the contractor will bring about 
a smaller cost per failure than that obtained by the user in the 
non-RIW case.
k
SlOD " C<M1> (22)




I ~ yearly interest rate
In the formula the modification times T are estimated by expectedm.
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Support Costs
There are three support costs encountered by the user of 
equipment warranted with a RIW contract. These three include the 
user's direct maintenance cost, initial support cost, and recurring 
support cost.
The military incurs a direct maintenance cost whether the given 
equipment is under a RIW contract or not. If a RIW contract is 
utilized, then the military has only the expenses relative to removal/ 
replacement of the failed unit along with the cost of shipping the 
unit to the contractor. The value of the total user direct maintenance 
cost C^ 2  for a RIW contract can be determined by multiplying the 
expected number of failures by the average cost per failure. This 
yields the equation below.
CDM2 - < W „ ^ CF2
■ (UoCF2Ho V /0 <24>
where
- the number of operational units,
0^2 “ cost per failed unit,
Ho - average number of hours a unit operates in a month, 
Tw - length of warranty period in months,
and
6 ■ the average MTBF over the warranty as found by equation
(15).
In general the initial support cost represents a saving
for a RlW-procurement because a substantial investment in test and
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support equipment, manuals and other start-up costs is not required. 
The amount of saving is dependent upon Whether the item is one already 
in the military's inventory or not. If the item is in the military's 
inventory, then the saving is smaller because an initial support cost 
has already been incurred. Since represents an investment it is
amortised on a straight line basis.
Recurring support cost which Includes such items as
administrative and preventative maintenance costs, may be higher than 
its non-RIW counterpart. T hlB  is due to the fact that the cost of 
administering the RIW is more involved.
ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF A RIW 
Although a RIW offers a potential benefit to the military user, 
it is not applicable in all procurements. The model developed in
previous sections of this chapter determines whether or not a warranty
is economically attractive by computing the total amortized saving 
(loss) of a RIW for a period of T^ months, i.e.,
SAVING (T ) - LCC (T ) - LCC9(T ) (25)W <L W Jm W
If the RIW procurement is economically attractive, i.e., a saving
for some time period of months exists, the model determines the
optimum number of months that the contract should be employed. This
is carried out by testing all integer values of T from 12 months towa120 months. The lower bound of 12 months is used to test the model
gThe economic value of a RIW contract model has been programmed 
In Fortran IV. A detail flowchart for this program is found in 
Appendix A.
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because the nature of a RIW requires a sufficiently long period for the 
reliability improvement program to be conducted. The upper bound of 
120 months is used because it represents the average lifetime of 
avionic equipment.
To illustrate the model, five hypothetical procurements will 
be used. Values for each of the cases have been extrapolated from 
data obtained from existing RIW contracts within the Department of 
Defense. It is felt that these sample procurements represent a cross- 
section of equipment type, complexity, reliability and costs.
Assumptions
The parameters given in table 4 will be used for the 
evaluation of the five hypothetical procurements.
Table 4
Parameters for Economic Value Model
Parameter Symbol Value
Equipment Lifetime TL 120 months
Minimum Period Before Modification Tmin 3 months
Discount Interest Rate I 10Z
Risk Factor r 4Z
Contractor Profit Factor X 10%
The Rate of Modification d .1096
Each of the values in Table 4 represents the average or expected value 
associated with equipment that might be subjected to a RIW contract. 
The value for the rate of modification d was derived by assuming that
39
the probability that a contractor would inaugurate an equipment
modification over the period 3 months to 24 months was .90. By
employing equation (13) obtained for the cumulative distribution of
the random variable T and the information of the last sentence, thein
value of the rate of modification d can be found.
The key values M* and M' which are required in the modification 
improvement function are defined as M' ■ 4 and M* « 1 + .2(9*-6^)/0^ 
where 6* is the specified MTBF and 0^ is the initial MTBF. The value 
of M* and the defining relation for M* were extrapolated from data 
acquired from existing RIW contracts.
Input for the Hypothetical Procurements
Table 5 lists the corresponding data elements for hypothetical 
procurements A, B, C, D, and E. The unit price of the five equipment 
types vary from relatively inexpensive to expensive. Reliability for 
the five cases ranges from a low-MTBF unit to a high-MTBF unit. 
Quantities to be purchased among the five cases vary from a small 
purchase size to a large purchase size. Also variations in the initial 
support costs of the five items indicate procurements of items already 
in inventory and items which are new and are not currently in the 
military's inventory.
Results
Table 6 presents the results obtained by applying the economic 
value of a RIW model to the five hypothetical procurement cases.
Table 5
Data Base for Test Cases
5
Symbol Proc. A Proc. B Proc. C Proc. D Proc. E
Unit Price P 19,461.80 15,461.80 23,091.80 516.30 1,842.70
Operating Hours per Month Ho 31.4 52.0 82.2 36.5 68.1
Number of Operational Units Uo 435 27 858 1,023 168
Initial MTBF ei 1,002.3 312.4 288.0 103.3 200.1
Specified MTBF 8* 1,157.5 472.3 430.0 131.1 269.1
User Cost per Failed Unit Non-RIW CF1 13,049.16 6,111.78 16,878.50 327.64 151.28
User Cost per Failed Unit with RIW CF2 1,288.27 608.41 1,663.55 41.56 24.28
Contractor Cost per failed Unit CF 12,142.66 5,391.49 14,889.33 226.53 116.21
Pipeline Time of Failed Unit TP 1.87 2.11 2.28 1.95 1.49
Initial Support Cost Non-RIW CIS1 50,000. 200,000. 60,000 20,000. 370,000.
Initial Support Cost with RIW CIS2 10,000. 0 0 0 31,000.
Recurring Support Cost Non-RIW Stsi 500 500 800 1,500 500
Recurring Support Cost with RIW CRS2 800 800 1,200 2,400 800
o
Table 6
Summary of Pertinent Output from Model
Symbol Proc. A Proc. B Proc. C Proc. D Proc. £
Optimum Warranty Period (Months) Tw 12 75 63 59 38
Cost of RIW per Unit 4,848.09 53,644.81 77,474.30 3,442.96 1,132.33
Average MTBF Over Contract Period ? 1,024 428 379 118 233
Final MTBF FMTBF 1,038 505 458 131 274
Units Procured Non-RIW Case U1 460 36 1,416 1,728 253
Units Procured with RIW U2 459 35 1,305 1,644 241
Total Life Cycle Cost Non-RIW TLCC1 3,032,247 2,570,453 277,648,227 7,524,406 517,305
Total Life Cycle Cost with RIW tlcc2 3,326,759 2,425,326 271,633,490 6,996,600 499,077
Saving(Loss) — -294,512 145,127 6,014,737 527,806 18,227
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Procurement A Which represents a moderately large purchase of 
a hlgh-MTBF unit with a moderately high purchase price was the only 
one of the five procurements found not to be acceptable. Its optimum 
saving(loss) was found to be - $294,512 for a period of 12 months.
Figures 7 through 11 display the warranty saving(loss) as 
a function of the warranty period. The graphs of the saving functions 
for procurements B, C, D, and E reflect definite optimum values for 
each procurement.
The results of the contractor reliability improvement programs 
for procurements B, C, D, and E are summarized in Table 7. Each of 
these procurements required four modifications and in each case the 
final MTBF exceeded the specified MTBF.
Table 7
Summary of Modification Programs
Variable Proc. B Proc. C Proc. D Proc. E
Number of Modifications 4 4 4 4
Initial MTBF 312.4 288.0 103.3 200.1
Specified MTBF 472.3 430.0 131.3 269.1
Average MTBF 428.0 379.0 118.0 233.0
Final MTBF 505.0 458.2 131.5 274.2
Optimum Warranty Period 75 63 59 38
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Saving(Loss)








































































In many situations it is necessary to classify or assign an 
individual to two or more groups under conditions of uncertainty. For 
example, it may be necessary to decide whether a college applicant 
is suitable to enter a particular college, or whether a firm should 
extend open-book credit to all new credit applicants for a sample 
period. Analogously in this study it is necessary to decide whether 
or not a procurement should be made with or without a RIW contract.
The method of two-way discriminant analysis is employed to 
classify a procurement into one of two groups— a non-RIW procurement 
group or a RIW procurement group. A requirement in applying the 
technique of discriminant analysis is that a set of measures be taken 
with respect to specific variables which are commonly defined on the 
elements of the two groups. The theory of this classification technique 
is dependent upon the set of means taken on the measures of each group 
together with the corresponding variances and covariances of the measures 
of both groups. Fundamentally the discriminant model classifies an 
arbitrary procurement to the particular group whose characteristics 
are similar to its own.
TWO-WAY DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS 
In order to Implement the methodology of two-way discriminant 
analysis it is necessary to define a finite number of variables on the
48
49
elements of the non-RIW procurement group and on the elements of the 
RIW procurement group. To illustrate the steps in employing the model 
let us assume for the purpose of simplicity that the classification 
of items into the two groups is dependent upon only two variables— say 
X and Y.
The first step in the analysis is to estimate the coefficients
C and C for the linear discriminant function f defined below: x y
f(X,Y) - C X+C Y (1)x y
iTo estimate the coefficients of the function f, samples of size n^ and 
must be respectively drawn from the non-RIW and the RIW groups.
Once the values of the coefficients are found a value of f can be 
calculated for any combination of X and Y, whether the combination is 
from the original samples or a new sample.^
Next a critical value of f called a cut-point is determined by 
utilizing the functional values generated by the function f for the 
samples of the two groups. If an unclassified procurement has a 
functional value determined by f that is greater than or equal to this 
cut-point, the procurement is classified into the non-RIW group. If,
........................4"
however, the corresponding functional value defined by f for the 
unclassified procurement is less than the break-polnt, then the 
procurement is classified in the RIW group. It is because of this 
classification technique that the name "discriminant analysis" comes
^Appendix B contains the details of how to determine the 
coefficients of f.
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forth. That is, the function f is defined so that it discriminates 
between the two groups of procurements.
The goal of discriminant analysis is to assign an unclassified 
procurement to one of the two procurement groups in such a way that 
the probability of misclassification is minimized. Figure 12 that 
follows presents a graphic illustration of the basic notions of 
discriminant analysis. In the figure the letter A Indicates the non- 
RIW group and the letter B indicates the RIW group. The scatter of 
points obtained from the samples from each population is enclosed by 
an ellipse which reflects some specified protion of the correspond­
ing population. Let L be a line drawn through the points where the 
two ellipses intersect. Now consider a third axis which is drawn 
from the origin so that it Is perpendicular to the line L. The 
coefficients of the function f are defined in such a way that the
function f projects the points of both populations to this third
axis. Thus the function f maps the two multivariate populations of 
procurements into two univariate populations. It can be seen that 
the overlap between the univariate populations A' and B* (represented
by the shaded area) is smaller than would be obtained by any other line
drawn through the ellipses formed by the scatter plot. Henc the 
probability of mlsclassification is minimized since the area of overlap 
is minimized.
The values f^ and f2 in Figure 12 represent the average values 





Illustration of the Discriminant Function
procurement groups. The figure indicates that f̂  Is sufficiently 
smaller than f̂ . However, there la an area of overlap between the 
populations. The smaller the area of overlap, the greater the 
probability of the discriminant function to correctly classify the 
non-RIW and RIW procurements. As mentioned the coefficients for the 
discriminant function are determined in such a way to minimize the 
size of the area of overlap or to maximize the proportion of procurements
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that will be classified correctly. The f* value in Figure 12 defines 
the break-point. If a value of f for an unclassified procurement is 
larger than or equal to f*, then the procurement is classified into 
the non-RIW group. Otherwise the procurement is classified as being 
applicable for RIW.
As mentioned we considered only two variables to view measures 
from the two populations of procurements so that the initial discussion 
of two-way discriminant analysis would be easier to understand. This 
discussion can be extended to Involve p-variables to reflect measures 
for both classes of procurements, where P >_ 2. The fundamental differ­
ence is that the linear discriminant function f is defined as a function 
of p-variables rather than one of two variables. Thus the general 
model requires the estimation of p-coefficients to represent f.
From a geometric standpoint the two populations would be 
distributed by p-variates rather than two variates. However, the 
function f would still project the two classes of procurements into 
two univaraite distributions as was illustrated by the previous figure.
The computational scheme developed in Appendix B is based upon 
several assumptions about the two classes of procurements. Namely, 
both populations of procurements must be normally distributed with 
equal covariance matrices. If large sample sizes are available many 
researchers tend to ignore the issue of validating these assumptions 
on the grounds that the classification procedure is fairly robust.
The assumptions for obtaining unbiased estimates of the coefficients 
of f have not been formally worked out for discriminant analysis.
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However, It is quite likely that the assumptions are similar to those 
for regression analysis.^
A MONTE CARLO GENERATOR OF PROCUREMENTS
One of the benefits the electronic digital computer has given
us is the ability to compile huge amounts of experience which reflect
the behavior of certain variables under controlled conditions. In
those cases where a random number generator is used as the source for
3generating this data the activity is called a Monte Carlo study. As 
mentioned earlier it is necessary that a sample of hypothetical 
procurements, which have been classified into the non-RIW and RIW 
procurement groups, be defined to represent a data base for the 
discriminant analysis model. Before the sample can be drawn, the 
universe of potential RIW procurements must be described in terms of a 
set of variables and their corresponding probability distributions.
It is these variables and their distributions that form the working 
mechanism of the Monte Carlo generator of procurements.
Once the universe of procurements has been described in terms 
of the Monte Carlo generator, a sample of 200 sets of measures with 
each set representing a procurement will be generated by using the
2Frank, Ronald E. and Paul E. Green, Quantitative Methods in 
Marketing (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1967), p. 74.
3Cooley, William W. and Paul R. Lohnes, Multivariate Data 
Analysis (New York: John Wiley, 1971), p. 270.
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model.^ Elements of the sample will then be classified Into one of the 
two procurement groups through the application of the economic value 
of a RIW contract model of the previous chapter. The data base 
obtained from this step is to be used to employ the discriminant 
analysis model.
Elements of the universe of potential candidates for applica­
tion of a RIW contract will be described in terms of 9 variables. These 
key variables were chosen because they reflect the necessary measures 
required to employ the economic value of a RIW model. . The table which 
follows lists these variables and their notation. It is assumed that 
the universe of potential procurements for RIW application are items 
already within the military's inventory. Because of this, the initial 
support cost will not be defined since its effect would be negligible. 
Also the monthly recurring support cost discussed in the model of 
Chapter 2 will be omitted since its effect is also in general 
negligible in the determination of the economic value of a RIW contract.
Two sources of information were used to find the necessary 
parameters to define the distributions of the key variables of the 
following table. One source of information was obtained from a survey 
of past and present RIW contracts within the Department of Defense. The 
results of the survey were not as complete as desired because most of 
the RIW contracts written by the Government are still active. There­
fore, no final conclusion could be drawn about the distributions of 
certain key variables.
4The listing of a Fortran IV program which represents the model 
is found in Appendix C.
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Table 8
Key Variables of the Procurement Generator
Variable Description
uo Number of Operating Units




CF1 User Cost per failed unit without RIU
CF2 User Cost per failed unit with RIW
CF Contractor cost per failed unit
TP Time In failure pipeline in months
The second source of Information came from a study conducted by
5the Hughes Aircraft Company on the F-106A aircraft. This study of the 
F-106A aircraft revealed reliability and cost of failure data on the 
inventory of front line units of this fighter plane. The cost informa­
tion was adjusted to reflect the rate of inflation over the years 
since the report.
It should be pointed out that the distributions that will be 
defined later for the key variables of Table 8 in no way reflect the
Myers and others, "Airborne Electronic Equipment Lifetime 
Guarantee," Hughes Aircraft Company, Rome Air Development Center Techni­
cal Report 69-363, November, 1969, pp. 22-56.
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universe of all procurements made within the Department of Defense. 
However, it is felt that the distributions to be defined represent 
characteristics of a subcollection of avionic items that the procurement 
officer would most likely experience for possible RIW application.
Distributions for Uq and Hq
The number of operational units associated with a procurement 
and the expected number of hours of operation of the equipment are 
defined in view of data obtained from the survey of RIW contracts 
within the Department of Defense. Operational units for a procurement 
will be defined by employing an exponential distribution with a mean 
of 380 units. Values generated by the exponential random number 
generator will be half adjusted to the nearest whole unit.
The expected number of operating hours per month of a particular 
equipment type will be described by a normal distribution with a mean 
of 56 hours and a standard deviation of 16.4 hours.
Distributions for 0., 0* and T1 p
The initial MTBF for an item is defined by the discrete dis­
tribution defined in Table 9 that follows. The source of Information 
used to define this specific distribution was obtained from the 




Distribution of the Initial MTBF of a Procurement
a b ProbCa^e^b)
51 hrs. 1,000 hrs. .786
1,000 hrs. 2,000 hrs. .092
2,000 hrs. 6,000 hrs. .069
6,000 hrs. 16,400 hrs. .053
The specified MTBF 0*, which reflects the reliability improve­
ment goal of the contractor is defined as 0* « x 8^, where x is an 
improvement factor which Is uniformly distributed between 1.02 and 1.50. 
The factor x produces a potential improvement in reliability of 2% to
50% over the contract period.
Pipeline time, which reflects the time a failed unit remains 
in a state of failure, is defined to be uniformly distributed between 
.5 and 3.25 months. Both the distribution for the specified MTBF and 
the pipeline time were obtained from the data compiled on existing 
contracts.
Distribution of CF1, CF2* and P
User cost per failure for an item not under a RIW is defined in
terms of the unit price of the item. Namely,
^  - yP (2)
58
where
y ** a factor which is uniformly distributed between .05 and 1.05,
and
P ■ the unit price of the item.
Cost per failure in this case can be as low as 5% of the unit price and
as high as 105% of the unit price.
User cost per failure for an item under a RIW is expressed
as a linear function of the user cost per failed unit without a RIW
contract. Namely,
CF2 - 9.452 + .098 Cn  (3)
This relation was obtained by applying the technique of regression 
analysis to data obtained from the survey of RIW contracts within the 
Department of Defense. The coefficient of correlation between the 
two variables was .93 for the sample of values.
As in the case of the initial MTBF, the unit price P is 
defined by a discrete distribution. The data base for this distri­
bution was obtained from the Hughes study of the F-106A aircraft.^ 
Contractor cost per failed unit is defined in terms of the 
user cost per failure for the non-RIW procurement case. In particular 




Distribution of Unit Prices of Procurements
a b Prob (a <_ P < b)









q » a factor which is uniformly distributed between .6 and .9.
It is assumed that because of the contractor's efficiency at repairing 
failed units, his cost per repair will be 60% to 90% of what it normally 
would cost the military.
CLASSIFICATION INTO SAMPLE GROUPS 
After the sample of 200 procurements has been generated by the 
Monte Carlo generator, each element must be classified into either the 
non-RIW or the RIW procurement groups. This task is carried out by 
applying the economic value of an RIW model of Chapter 2 to each 
element of the sample. Application of the economic value of the RIW
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model to the sample of 200 designated 58 procurements Into the non-RIW 
group and 142 Into the RIW group. The number of elements In each 
group was expected because many of the characteristics of the Monte 
Carlo generator were based on past RIW contracts. In Appendix D there 
are two tables which respectively list the non-RIW group and RIW group 
of procurements In terms of their key measures.
APPLICATION OF THE DISCRIMINANT MODEL
Given the two groups of procurements determined In the last
section it is now time to apply the discriminant model. The results
that were obtained for the two groups of procurements defined in the
last section were found by applying the computer program BMD04M developed
by the Department of Blomathematlcs at the University of California 
8at Los Angeles.
In applying the technique of discriminant analysis it is 
prudent to choose the combination of explanatory variables that will 
produce the best discriminant function. After trying various combina­
tions of variables, six variables were selected to define the linear 
discriminant function. Table 11 which follows on the next page 
presents the explanatory variables aong with their corresponding 
coefficients.
gDixon, W.J., ed. BMP; Biomedical Computer Programs. (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 221-220.
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Table 11
Coefficients of Explanatory Variables
Variable Description Coefficient
1 (total nutfcer of units purchased) x .01 .00026
2a (number of failures per month) x .1 -.00013
3 (initial MTBF) x .01 .00010
4 relative change of the initial MTBF 
to the specified MTBF -.03963
5b (user monthly maintenance cost) x .00001 -.00014
6 ratio of user cost per failed unit 
to the unit price -.00313
aNumber of failures per month Is defined as (UqHq)/6^.
^User monthly maintenance cost Is defined as (HqUqC^)/9^.
Variables 1, 2, 3, and 5 in Table 11 were scaled because their 
corresponding entries in the covariance matrix were so large in their 
natural form that exponential overflows occurred when the inverse of 
the covariance matrix was determined by the BMD04M program.
CONFUSION MATRIX
Since it is known beforehand which group each sample procurement 
actually belongs to, we can prepare a table of correct and incorrect 
classifications as made by the discriminant function. This score sheet 
of correct and incorrect classifications is referred to as a confusion
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matrix. From the confusion matrix the success of the discriminant 
function can be discovered. Namely, the fewer the misclassifications 
of procurements into the two procurement groups, then the better the 
model.
The results of applying the discriminant function to the values 
of the six explanatory variables for the 200 sample procurements are 
found in Appendix E. The average functional value for the 58 elements 
in the non-RIW group is f^ ■ -.00473 while the average functional value 
for the 142 elements in the RIW group is f  ̂■ -.01235. The cut-point 
for the entire sample of 200 is f* * -.00854, which is the average 
of f^ and
The criteria for classification is that those procurements 
with functional values greater than or equal to the cut-point are 
classified into the non-RIW group while those procurements with 
functional values less than the cut-point are classified into group 2. 
Using this criteria the confusion matrix that follows was determined 
for the sample of 200 procurements.
Table 12 
Confusion Matrix for Sample
Actual Predicted Group Membership










The totals along the diagonal of the matrix indicate the 
number of correct classifications or hits for the given discriminant 
function. There were 141 hits which indicates 70.5% of the procurements 
were classified correctly.
Discriminatory Power
It is now of interest to determine the discriminatory power 
of the function obtained in this application. To test the discrimina-
9tory power of the discriminant function a chi-square test is applied. 
Accordingly, it is necessary to find
Q - (n-e)2/e + (n~e)2/e (5)
where n and n, respectively, denote the correct and incorrect clasifi- 
cations made by the function and e and e respectively denote the 
expected number of classifications if classifications were made at 
random.
Using the fact that the probability of a successful random 
classification is .5, then e * e « 100 for the sample of 200. From 
Table 12 it is found that n = 141 and n = 59. Applying the definition 
of Q it is found that Q * 33.62.
Our objective is to test the following hypothesis:
Hq I Correct classifications occurred randomly.
The discriminant function did better than chance.
The variable Q is chi-square distributed with one degree of freedom. At 
the one percent level it is found from a standard table that chi-square
9Press, S. James, Applied Multivariate Analysis, (New York:
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1972), pp. 382-383.
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with one degree of freedom is 10.8. Thus it follows that Q = 33.62 
is certainly significant and we reject the null hypothesis. Hence we 
conclude that the discriminant function does better than chance.
An Interval Cut-Point
In some cases an interval cut-point is used as a basis for the 
classification rather than a single point. Examining the table of 
functional values for the sample of 200 procurements, which is found 
in Appendix E, it is seen that the values are ordered according to 
their f values. Furthermore there is an area of overlap of the two 
procurement groups which falls between the 6th ranked value of f 
which is +.00436 and the 163rd ranked value of f which is -.01722.
When referring to these values, we will denote b = -.01722 and 
c = +.00436.
If. we have reason to believe that any procurement under 
examination for a RIW contract will not differ significantly from the 
relationships found for the sample procurements, then the interval 
with endpoints b and c can be used in the following way: Unclassified
procurements with f values less than or equal to b are accepted for 
RIW contracts while those procurements with f values greater than or 
equal to c are placed in the non-RIW category. In those cases where 
unclassified procurements have f values falling between points b and c 
additional Information is required before a decision is made.
CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of this study Is to extend the methodologies 
presently available to the United States Air Force with respect to 
the application of the Reliability Improvement Warranty concept.
Two models are developed to quantify the criteria presently used for 
the selection of RIW contracts.
The first model deals with the determination of the economic 
value of a RIW contract. Development of this model was contingent 
upon the understanding of the RIW concept. Computing the economic 
value of a RIW contract involves finding the difference between the 
Life Cycle CoBt for the non-RIW alternative and the RIW alternative. 
Only cost8 that varied with the warranty's terms and conditions were 
considered in the development of the model.
The second model utilizes the theory of discriminant analysis 
to judge whether or not to employ a RIW in a procurement. This 
model requires defining a linear function in terms of a group of 
key variables, which represented measures defined upon the universe 
of procurements. The first step in employing the model involves 
calculating the coefficients of the terms of the linear function.
A requirement for the computation of the set of coefficients is that 
samples be available from both the non-RIW and RIW procurement groups.
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Due to the limited experience of the Department of Defense with RIW 
contracts a very small data base was available to carry out this phase 
of the study. To overcome this obstacle, the Monte Carlo technique is 
utilized to generate the required data base. Each component of the 
generated procurement is defined in terms of a set of characteristic 
values which Includes cost and reliability measures. Members of the 
sample were later classified into non-RIW or RIW groups by employing 
the economic value of the RIW model. Given the two groups of sample 
procurements, the coefficients of the linear function were found. Then 
the discriminant analysis technique was applied accordingly.
CONCLUSIONS
Enumerated below are the conclusions drawn from this study to 
extend the methodology of when to employ a RIW contract in making a 
procurement. Each conclusion is based solely on the models employed 
in this study and the assumptions under which they operate.
1. This study leads to three possible approaches to determining 
when to employ a RIW contract.
a. Approach number one is to apply the economic value of 
a RIW contract to classify a procurement to either a 
non-RIW or RIW group.
b. Given a representative data base for both procurement 
groups, then approach number two Involves utilizing
a discriminant analysis model to classify procurement 
types.
c. Approach number three is a combination of the first 
two approaches. Given the appropriate conditions for 
discriminant analysis application, an interval cut-point 
is found. If an arbitrary procurement has a discriminant 
functional value greater than or equal to the right- 
endpoint of the interval, it is classified into the 
non-RIW group. Furthermore, if the arbitrary procurement 
has a discriminant functional value that is less than 
the left-endpoint of the interval, then it is classified 
into the RIW group. In those cases where the procurement 
has a functional value which falls between both endpoints 
of the interval, then the economic value of the RIW 
model should be applied. This approach is better than 
approach number two in that it reduces the risk of 
misclassiflcatlon induced by discriminant analysis.
Based upon the limited success of the RIW concept within
i 1
the Department of Defense and in certain areas of 
the civilian sector, the number of applications of the RIW 
contract will probably increase sharply. The three approaches 
given in the first conclusion are Independent of the avionic 
industry and thus can be used by buyers in other areas.
The economic value of a RIW model gives the procurement 
officer a method of determining the destiny of a procure­
ment relative to a RIW application. Like any model of a
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complex process It doe6 not Include all factors. However,
It does provide estimates of various costs and reliability 
variables associated with the warranty.
A* In those cases where a decision to employ a RIW has been 
made, the economic value model can be employed to find the 
optimal or most cost-effective warranty period.
5. Even though the economic value of a RIW model determines 
the optimal warranty period, the warranty period should 
be long enough to permit the benefits of the warranty to 
be accomplished. Proper use of the RIW requires the 
product to reach a state of design stability so that 
specified reliability improvements can be employed. A rule 
of thumb might be to use a warranty period of at least 
three years.
6. The economic value of a RIW model simplifies the task of 
warranty pricing. Based upon cost and reliability estimates, 
the cost of a RIW may be obtained. Hence, for the procure­
ment officer, the pricing of a RIW contract is not any more 
difficult to find than the determination of the appropriate 
number of spares required in any purchase.
7. The cut-point developed in the application of the discriminant 
model of Chapter 3 is the equivalent of the break-even point 
for the application of RIW contracts.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
A number of recommendations are made In this section with regard 
to the future extension of the methodology of when an RIW should be 
applied.
1. One of the limitations of the economic value of a RIW model
is that it does not treat the Influence of inflation upon
Life Cycle Cost. This model should be extended to include 
the effects of inflation.
" 2. Another limitation of the economic value of a RIW model is
that it restricts the determination of the Life Cycle Cost
in both alternatives to the given warranty period'. It is 
recommended that the economic value model be extended to 
Include the option to renew or extend a RIW beyond its 
contract period. Certainly there are situations when 
the option to renew or extend a RIW contract beyond its 
initial period may be attractive. For example, in those 
programs requiring a large investment in initial support 
costs, the option to renew the RIW contract should be a 
valuable alternative to have in the initial contract.
At the same time it is good to leave the final agreement 
to extend or renew a RIW contract open until the initial 
warranty period is near its completion.
3. The economic value model should be extended to determine 
both the optimal warranty period and the optimal specified 
MTBF which maximize the saving due to a RIW contract.
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4. The economic value model should be extended to compare 
the Life Cycle Coat related to the RIW alternative to 
other warranty alternatives such as the newly developed 
RIW with Guaranteed MTBF coverage considered on the 
F-16 fighter plane.
5. The submodel of the economic value model which determines 
the number of spares for a procurement should be extended 
to cover various circumstances such as the geographic 
location of the repair depot with respect to the units 
under warranty and the variations In the structure of the 
failure pipelines.
6. The design of a common data base for the collection of 
pertinent data with respect to all RIW contracts within 
the Department of Defense Is necessary if future studies 
and evaluations are to be made on the RIW topic.
7. The efforts of Chapter 3 are considered only to be 
exploratory in nature. A full scale extension of the 
discriminant analysis model is recommended as a worthy 
undertaking, because it would equip the procurement 
officer with an efficient method of classifying a large 
Inventory of products to either the RIW group or non-RIW 
group.
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8. Discriminant analysis has been employed in this study 
as a means of classifying procurements Into the non-RIW 
or RIW groups. It Is recommended that the method of 
discriminant analysis be Investigated by the Department 
of Defense for possible application in other areas as a 
tool in making decisions under uncertainty*
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APPENDIX A 
FLOWCHART OF ECONOMIC VALUE OF RIW MODEL
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The mainline program for determining the economic value of a 
RIW contract is supported by 3 function subprograms and 3 subroutine 
subprograms. Given below is a list of these subprograms and a 
description of each.
HOD is a subroutine subprogram which determines the vector
of modifications to increase the MTBF of an item from 
0^ to 0*.
COST is a subroutine subprogram which determines the corres­
ponding vector of costs associated with each element of 
the modification vector returned by subroutine MOD.
TIME is a subroutine subprogram which computes a vector of
expected times for the corresponding vector of feasible 
modifications returned by the subroutine MOD.
MTBF is a function subprogram which computes the final
MTBF as a result of applying the vector of feasible 
modifications.
AMTBF is a function subprogram which determines the average
or expected MTBF of the item over the contract period.
ECMOD is a function subprogram which determines the expected
total cost of all feasible modifications implemented 
during the warranty period. The cost of each 
modification is discounted and amortized.
The figure which follows represents a general flowchart of the 
mainline FORTRAN IV program, which determines the warranty period that 
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DERIVATION OF THE DISCRIMINANT MODEL
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Assume that the collection of all procurements is classified 
into two populations, where population 1 represents the universe of 
all procurements in which a RIW contract is not applicable and popula­
tion 2 is the universe of all procurements in which a RIW is applicable.
An element belonging to either of the two populations will be denoted 
in terms of a p-component vector of measurements taken on the item.
This vector of measures will be referred to as a procurement vector
throughout the discussion which follows. The means of-both popula-
•+ “*■
tions will be respectively denoted as and y2* In addition, and 
D2 will be utilized to respectively indicate the covariance matrices 
of populations 1 and 2.
-►
The objective of this section is to determine a vector c to 
represent the coefficients of the linear discriminant function f of 
p-variablesThis vector of coefficients will be obtained so that 
the resulting function f will minimize the expected number of 
misclassifications.
The discussion which follows is divided into two main subdivisions. 
One subdivision deals with the case where the population parameters are 
known while the other treats the case where the population parameters 
are unknown.
KNOWN POPULATION PARAMETERS 
In some cases the two populations of interest are well established 
and their population parameters are known. There are various reasons 
for justifying such an assumption. For example, in the past many
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observations nay have been taken from the populations and It may be
felt that for all Intents and purposes that the means and covariance
matrices are well established.
Suppose that the two multivariate populations have distributions
that are defined by probability density functions g^ and ĝ . Let p^
and p^» respectively, indicate the a priori probabilities that an
arbitrary vector x, which represents the p-measures of some unclassified
procurement, belongs to either population 1 and 2. Finally, let c^ for
i 4 j denote the loss (sometimes called the regret or opportunity
loss; c.. ^.0) associated with classifying a procurement represented 
■+ J
by x into population i when in fact the correct decision should be to 
classify x into population j * For i“j let c^=0.
Classifying into the Two Populations
The decision-theoretic approach to making decisions is often 
based upon the premise that a classification be made which minimizes 
the average loss or risk. If a^ and a^ are used to denote the actions 
of classifying a given procurement into populations 1 and 2, respectively, 
then the riBk R can be defined as
R = c^2Prob(a^,xe Pop.2) + c^jProb(a^,xe Pop.l)
« c^ProbCa^Jxe Pop.2)p2 + c21Prob(a2|xe Pop.l^ (1)
Next the regions of classification A^ and A2 must be respec­
tively defined for populations 1 and 2. These regions have the property 
that if an arbitrary procurement vector x falls into region A^, then
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the procurement is classified as belonging to population i for i ® 1 
or 2. The problem associated with selecting the two regions is that 
they must be defined so as to minimize the risk R.
Since the density functions of populations 1 and 2 are given 
as and g^» equation (1) can be reexpressed as follows.
R - c12Prob(xeAjJxePop.2)p2 + c2^Prob(xeA2|xEPop.l)p1
■ C12P2V2(J) & + C21PlV el<5) d*- <2)
Since /. g.(x) dx + I. g.(x) dx ■ 1 equation (2) can be expressed as 
*1 1 2
R ' ;A1[c12I,282 (J) ' c21pl*l + c21Pl (3)
It is now clear that the risk R will be minimized if is selected to 
Include all vectors x for which
y
C12P2g2 “ C21P181 ^  -  0 ^  
while A2 is defined to include those vectors x for which the reverse
inequality holds
Thus the minimum risk rule is to classify an arbitrary
procurement vector x into population 1 if
gl ^  ( fl2 \* £2i | , ■ constant (5)
*2(5> \ C21 )\ Pl
Two Normal Populations
Let us now assume that the two populations of procurement 
types are normally distributed with means y2 and covariance
^Press, S. James. Applied Multivariate Analysis. (New York: 
Holt Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1972), pp. 371-372.
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(6)
matrixes and D2. Thus the minimum risk rule defined by equation 
(5) can be revised if and g2 are replaced with the given distri­
butions. Thus x belongs to population 1 if
iDj^expE-.SCx - y p ’ D ^ 1 (x-v^)] / \hz\
\D21~^exp[-.5 (x -v2)' D2-1 (x-u2)]  ̂C21 j^Pl I
Applying the natural logarithm to the inequality given by (6) and 
simplifying the resulting inequality implies that x is classified 
into population 1 if
—1 -> -1 -*■ -y (II P?c12 \(x-u2)' D2 1 (x-u2) - (x-y )1 Dx 1 (x-y1) > 2 log! 1 i 2 12 (7)
\|j>2l P ^ l  /
Usual Assumption
In most applications of the discriminant model researchers
assume that c^2 » c21 (loses due to misclassification are equal),
Pl“p2 (prior probabilities are equal) and D^-D2“D(the populations
2have equal covariance matrlcs). Given these assumptions the right- 
hand side of the inequality in (7) becomes ze'ro and the left-hand 
side simplifies to give the rule that follows:
Classify the procurement represented by x into population 1 if
[(P1-y2^,D 1] x >, ^  - y2'D . (8)
Because the parameter values are all known, both expressions in the 
brackets of inequality (8) can be computed and the Inequality tested.
2If the necessary information is available to compute estimates 
for p^ and p2 then the assumption PjT^ is not re<lui,:ed'
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Note that the expression in the bracket of the left-side of inequality 
(8) yields the vector of coefficients of function f. In addition the 
expression on the right side of inequality (8) represents the break­
point of the classification scheme.
UNKNOWN POPULATION PARAMETERS 
In this section the population are assumed to be unknown» 
which is usually the case. As in the previous section our goal 
is to find a vector of coefficients to complete the definition of 
the discriminant function f.
Arbitrary Distributions
Suppose that the two populations of procurement types have 
functions with unknown parameter values and further suppose the 
distributional forms of both populations are known though not necessarily 
normal. Assume that Independent observations from both populations 
exist. To obtain a classification rule we must first find maximum 
likelihood estimates of the population parameters by utilizing the 
samples from both populations. Next the estimates for the population 
parameters are substituted into inequality (5). If the sample sizes 
from each population are sufficiently large, the results obtained




Assume that the populations are normally distributed with equal
covariance matrices and unknown parameter values. Suppose samples of
sizes m^ and m^ are chosen from populations 1 and 2, respectively. Our
problem Is as before to classify an arbitrary procurement vector Into
population 1 or 2 with minimum risk. The best estimates of the two
population mean vectors are the sample mean vectors obtained from
the two given samples. Let x^ and denote the sample mean vectors
from populations 1 and 2, respectively.
The sample covariance matrix S Is used to estimate the population
covariance matrix D. The matrix S Is defined as
nu
ml
(”l + V 2)S <*U-*L>' +J 1<;2i S > <J2t^r2) ’ <9>
where and Xjj represent arbitrary sample vectors from populations 
1 and 2, respectively. Substituting these estimates Into inequality 
(8) and simplifying yields
^ X1-X2̂  S”1^* —  •5txiS"1*i “ x2 S_1 x2̂
> . 5 [ ( x ^ ) 'S_1 (xx - x2)] (10)
The expression In the brackets of the left-side of Inequality (10)
defines the vector of estimates of the coefficients of the function f
while the expression on the right-side of the Inequality defines the
4cut-point for the two populations.
4Anderson, T.W., An Introduction to Multivariate Statistical 
Analysis (New York: John Wiley, 1958), p. 137.
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C * * * * *  PROGRAM G E N E R A ! E 5  ME AS URE S  FOR KEY V A R I A B L E S  * » « » *
c........................................................................
D I M E N S I O N  C F 1 ( 9 *  » C F 2 1 5 ) ,A1 ( 9 )  *A2 ( 5 )
C --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C V t C T C R S  A l * C F l  R E P R E S E N T  THE CUMUL AT I VE  D I S T R I B U T I O N  FOR U P R I C E
C VECTORS  A 2 . C F 2  R E P R E S E N T  THE CUMUL AT I VE  D I S T R I B U T I O N  FOR XMT6F
C--------------------------------------------------------------
DATA C F l / O . , . 7 5 , , t t d 1 3 , . 9 0 6 3 , . 9 2 6 , . 9 4  3 5 , . 9 6 2  5 , . 9 8 7  5 . 1 . /
DATA C F 2 / 0 . , . 7 8 6 , . 8 7 8 , . 9 4 7 , 1 . /
DATA A 1 / 2 0 0 . , 4 0 1 5 . . 7 3 3 0 . , 1 1 6 4  5 . , 1 5 4 6 0 .  , 1 9 2 7 5 . , 2 3 0 9 0 , , 2 6 9 0 5 . ,  
1 3 0 7 2 0 . /
DAT A A 2 / 5 1 . , 1 0 0 0 . . 2 0 0 0 , , 6 0 0 0 . , 1 6 4 0 0 . /
C--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C * * * * *  2CU S E T S  CF MEASURES FOR THE KEY V A R I A B L E S  ARE GENERATED
c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DO l  1 = 1 , 2 0 0
K U N 1 T S = R A N V A R ( 2 , 3 8 0 , DUMMY) * . 5  
1 F I KON I T S . L T . 2 5 )  K.UNI T 5 = 2 5  
I F ( K U N I T S . G T . 9 9 9 9 ) K U N I T S = 9 9 9 9
o u nit s=kunits
OHOURS =RMNVAR( 3 . 5 6 . , 1 6 . 4 )
X = 1 , + R A N V A R ( 1 » . 0 2 , . 5 0 )
T P = R A N V A R ( 1 , . 5 , 3 . 2 5 )
U P R I C E = G £ N ( C F 1 , A 1 . 9 )
X M T B F = G E N ( C F 2 , A 2 , 5 )
S MT B F = X* X MT 8 F  
Y= R ANVAR ( 1 , . 0 5 , 1 . 0 5 )
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C F 1 = Y « U P R I C E  
C F 2 = 9 . A 5 Z * . 0 9 B * C F l  
Q=RANVAR ( I t *  6 0  • • 9 0 )
C F s t J *  C F 1
C * » « * #  <EY VALUES ARE W R I T T E N  ONTO A MAG TAP E * # * « *
WRI TE I 7 »2 J O U N I T S . O H O U R S .  X MT B F , S M T 0 F » U P R I C E » C F 1 . C F Z * C F , TP 
Z FORMAT I F 6 . 0 , F 5 . 2 . F 7 . 1 , F 7 . 1 , F 8 . 2 . F 8 . 2 . F B . 2 . F 8 . 2 . F A . 2 >
1 C ONT I NUE  
REWI ND 7 
E N D F I L E  7 




f u n c t i o n  g e n ( C f . a . m  
c------------------------ ---------------
C SUBPROGRAM G E N E R A T E S  r a n d o m  VAR I ATE 5  F R O *  CUM.  D I S T R I B U T I O N S
C ALL VALUES ARC I N T E R P O L A T E D  L I N E A R L Y
D I M E N S I O N  CF 19 )  . A ( 9 )
XNUME=R A N V A R ( 1 , 0 . « 1 . )
DO 1 1=1. K -
I F l X N U M B . L T . C F m  J GO TO 2
1 C O N T I N U E
2 F = ( X N U M B - C F ( 1 - 1 ) ) * ( C F ( 1 ) - C F ( I - 1 1 )
G EN=F  * ( A t l ) - A ( I - l ) ) + A ( I - 1 )
RETURN
END
F U N C T I O N  R B B R N G ( N )
C T H I S  SUBROGRAM S E E D S  GENERATOR AND F I N D S  RANDOM N O .  BETWEEN 0 . 1
 -----------------------------------------------------------------------
I F ( N , N E . O ) N S E E 0 = 9 B 7 5 * 7  
N 5 E E D s n S E E D * 2 6 2 1 A 7  





F U N C T I O N  R A r t v / A R t U N D t A . B l
C THE FOLLOWI NG i s  a  L I S T  OF PARAMETER D E F I N I T I O N S
C X I  NO NAME OF 0 1  ST ARGUMENT A ARGUMENT B
C 1 UN 1 FORM LOW L I M I T U P P E R  L I M I T
C 2 e x p o n e n t i a l MEAN DUMMY
C 3 NORMAL MEAN STANDARD D E V .
I F c l S H . E Q . D G O  TO 1 0
RAN = RBBRN<»10)
ISW=1
1 0  GO T O ( 1 0 7 i 2 0 ?  < 3 0 7 ) . K I N D
C---------------------------------- -------------------------------
C ***** UNI F ORM D 1 5 T  *■
 -----------------------------
1 0 7  R AN s RBB n G I O )
R A N V A R = R A N * ( B - A ) * A  
R ET URN
C -------------------------------------------------------------------
t  ***** E X P O N E N T I A L  0 1  ST
C -------------------------------------------------------------------
2 0 7  £ X = A
R A N = R B 0 R N G I O )




C • * * * •  NORMAL D I S T  *****
C------------------------------------------
3 0 6  R l = R B B R i N b ( 0 )
R2 = R B B R n G ( 0 )
R = < - 2 . 0 * A L 0 G ( R i ) ) * * . 5 * C 0 S ( 2 . 0 * 3 . 1 M 6 * R 2 >




NON-RIW AND RIW PROCUREMENT GROUPS
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Table 13
Population 1 - Procurements Without RIW Contracts
°0 Ho •i e * tp p CF1 CF2 CF
599 52.3 199.8 244.9 2.82 294.40 163.62 25.49 138.95
25 45.5 1,001.5 1,001.5a 0.63 1,738.00 125.57 21.76 99.58
895 47.3 6,006.6 6,006.6 2.95 4,060.90 2,932.24 296.81 2,342.03
433 48.6 452.5 523.5 0.59 1,716.30 90.46 18.32 76.77
2,243 65.2 572.5 636.2 1.15 4,043.10 4,004.02 401.85 3,183.19
118 38.4 511.9 650.9 0.77 1,875.50 913.18 98.94 805.20
159 49.3 585.9 816.2 1.52 501.30 400.66 48.72 354.51
308 61.3 320.2 324.0 3.08 763.20 86.19 17.90 61.39
635 51.9 2,013.4 2,655.4 2.95 720.40 614.52 69.68 523.81
122 92.7 398.5 509.5 0.93 4,051.50 1,018.88 109.30 911.96
364 44.3 260.8 302.1 1.31 371.90 103.41 19.59 88.03
gIn those cases where the economic value model found any Improvement in reliability not feasible, 
the specified MTBF Is assigned the initial MTBF.
Table 13 (Continued)
Do Ho ei 9* TP P Si CF2 CF
836 70.6 420.5 445.8 2.20 1,174.30 166.91 25.81 149.6
543 70.0 1,000.2 1,037.7 2.86 1,400.40 1,406.36 147.28 1,109.92
320 50.8 182.9 248.5 0.56 1,141.40 171.34 26.24 153.75
236 59.3 324.1 334.1 1.79 2,046.20 110.00 20.23 90.02
256 63.7 513.2 581.1 2.26 2,295.10 2,117.10 216.93 1,785.40
1,611 46.4 461.0 544.0 1.76 1,906.40 1,363.88 143.11 1,208.80
407 53.9 151.1 186.0 2.03 614.30 97.05 18.96 74.52
416 38.9 2,015.7 2,146.4 3.22 1,238.10 1,143.91 121.55 971.39
30 85.2 81.2 98.8 0.85 633.80 588.25 67.10 512.68
638 34.2 6,023.2 6.223.1 3.04 535.60 556.71 64.01 495.03
128 25.3 256.9 315.9 0.64 4,079.70 1,962.97 201.82 1,725.05
435 31.4 1,002.3 1,089.8 1.87 19,275.10 13,049.16 1,288.27 11,149.20
38 65.2 195.0 215.2 1.77 1,132.50 160.02 25.13 134.92
25 52.3 2,005.2 2,005.2 2.55 1,062.40 151.68 24.32 113.14
Table 13 (Continued)
uo Ho el 0* TP p CF1 to CF
33 89.5 2,014.6 2,706.4 3.21 2,013.00 338.04 42.58 295.64
77 41.1 268.0 325.7 0.83 775.10 87.76 18.05 78.93
103 48.1 122.7 147.9 1.34 4,071.00 1,555.24 161.87 1,340.23
297 54.5 6,017.0 6,017.0 2.73 350.90 149.66 24.12 116.68
737 48.5 321.8 390.4 0.99 796.90 84.18 17.70 74.08
40 40.1 459.9 489.9 0.76 342.70 107.01 19.94 80.47
432 75.7 569.0 569.0 2.51 251.00 14.12 10.84 9.37
420 19.7 2,000.3 2,000.3 1.75 580.90 73.82 16.69 56.47
935 76.0 6,025.2 6,115.1 2.04 1,125.70 1,131.91 120.38 905.80
855 21.7 503.7 503.7 0.75 2,215.00 156.36 24.78 113.27
425 63.0 116.1 118.1 1.21 1,904.60 312.64 40.09 237.20
910 38.3 1,002.1 1,017.6 0.81 1,243.70 232.02 32.19 171.32
215 75.5 397.0 442.1 1.87 1,149.20 290.10 32.88 227.20
274 67.6 487.5 499.4 0.65 237.50 155.88 24.73 135.89
Table 13 (Continued)
°0 Ho ei 0* P S i CF2 CF
95 49.1 6,017.4 7,167.1 2.59 1,091.30 791.12 86.98 654.43
366 58.8 431.2 570.5 1.52 2,173.80 1,701.60 176.21 1,523.47
878 59.0 6,005.2 6,005.2 1.63 847.10 234.00 32.38 142.87
108 57.8 422.8 450.4 0.56 1,300.80 678.38 75.93 546.33
164 16.8 2,001.2 2,244.9 2.31 699.10 639.25 72.10 528.41
142 51.7 113.1 119.5 0.87 1,497.20 942.39 101.81 771.20
716 63.1 283.4 333.4 3.03 1,819.10 1,842.29 190.00 1,642.44
790 67.0 488.0 498.0 1.22 699.30 674.41 75.54 558.26
149 58.3 6,028.7 6,028.7 0.76 2,034.70 579.54 66.25 417.27
61 42.7 71.6 84.4 0.85 4,065.90 897.57 97.41 734.42
25 55.1 164.5 215.7 0.90 1,410.40 1,085.93 115.87 961.28
331 47.1 311.8 365.5 0.66 1,235.50 858.88 93.62 768.46
25 53.6 1,002.0 1,302.7 1.09 797.00 619.20 70.13 540.96
736 71.3 98.8 106.0 1.52 487.10 371.42 45.85 317.80
Table 13 (Continued)
Do Ho 91 9* TP p CF1 CF2 CF
160 51.2 273.3 281.5 3.09 4,074.20 1,823.06 188. U 1,603.90
195 98.9 498.4 591.7 3.09 251.90 154.73 24.62 129.24
70 57.3 123.8 133.7 2.23 1,274.00 109.44 20.18 95.40
56 67.5 6,007.2 6,007.2 1.07 598.10 334.08 42.19 241.57
46 53.3 368.1 391.1 1.84 1,131.00 645.26 722.69 570.93
SO
Table 14
Population 2 - Procurements With RIW Contracts
co Ho 91 0* TP P c n CF2 CF
215 59.2 1,005.0 1,421.1 1.57 997.80 496.16 58.08 334.67
290 66.9 6,023.7 6,237.4 0.70 2,269.90 1,409.18 147.55 987.14
783 27.9 244.2 350.2 0.82 1,528.90 482.41 56.73 300.36
701 44.7 223.2 295.7 1.06 15,460.60 3,938.38 395.41 3,182.87
25 70.1 164.1 185.9 2.45 1,265.30 392.82 47.95 259.07
711 64.8 267.7 375.9 0.66 4,073.00 2,095.65 214.83 1,633.15
100 45.5 1,005.3 1,169.6 2.16 1,826.60 190.17 28.09 118.78
1,460 64.8 580.0 645.8 2.42 667.40 557.53 64.09 389.54
29 59.3 1,008.3 1,503.4 0.71 2,189.90 2,289.70 233.84 1,436.60
201 68.9 6,025.6 7,735.2 1.49 1,266.80 829.21 90.71 668.42
171 48.8 556.0 765.1 2.61 401.40 299.25 38.78 186.74
94 44.9 2,015.6 2,205.5 1.84 898.90 220.63 31.07 160.06
215 51.8 246.5 364.8 0.91 958.40 827.01 90.05 685.66
Table 14 (Continued)
uo Ho 9i 0* TP P Si CF2 CF
41 75.0 415.2 550.1 1.13 11,645.20 10,933.56 1,080.94 7,453.01
173 43.7 540.5 591.4 2.94 7,831.00 653.60 73.50 413.18
,170 45.7 184.8 215.6 1.74 1,215.40 203.67 29.41 413.18
751 81.7 171.1 232.5 0.73 642.00 304.56 39.30 183.17
62 52.7 105.8 127.6 1.42 1,667.10 373.15 46.02 256.97
412 64.5 192.8 257.4 1.88 4,080.40 4,014.44 402.87 3,235.39
218 60.3 154.6 172.5 2.30 2,125.30 1,758.35 181.77 1,363.97
271 72.4 636.8 894.7 2.07 2,074.90 1,793.66 185.23 1,173.78
205 47.6 275.6 402.4 3.13 1,670.10 802.72 88.12 511.98
378 57.7 6,015.4 6,748.1 2.98 4,044.70 2,492.22 253.69 1,960.24
383 30.6 6,010.6 7,511.4 3.06 512.80 426.19 51.22 256.90
937 61.5 485.5 708.8 1.52 235.00 104.61 19.70 74.91
49 68.5 439.8 624.5 2.18 661.00 414.73 50.10 345.08
127 63.3 752.1 630.5 1.57 4,040.20 2,647.88 268.94 1,652.94
Table 14 (Continued)
uo Ho 6i 0* TP P CF1 CF2 CF
26 60.4 485.3 689.6 1.75 920.30 267.59 35.68 215.53
25 37.4 279.9 370.6 3.20 738.60 145.63 23.72 92.68
345 48.5 569.4 588.1 1.55 1,088.60 1,105.22 117.76 816.87
287 45.5 585.4 596.4 1.48 435.60 440.07 52.58 291.75
1,353 81.5 272.9 349.6 1.63 1,442.70 250.99 34.05 194.16
336 37.0 408.6 578.6 2.02 2,344.40 1,003.28 107.77 777.41
38 67.2 357.6 486.3 1.18 7,831.10 4,356.54 436.39 3,479.10
285 44.8 1,006.4 1,095.8 2.30 662.80 246.24 33.58 175.04
619 58.9 392.9 413.3 2.66 1,374.00 677.13 75.81 514.33
599 67.7 295.2 440.1 1.85 561.80 492.40 57.71 297.14
379 33.5 368.1 480.4 2.08 3,036.50 1,468.77 153.39 1,009.37
714 35.6 181.2 245.5 0.76 4,058.40 2,162.57 221.38 1,601.24
154 49.9 160.8 231.6 1.86 7,831.80 8,136.73 806.85 6,368.14
530 51.9 1,004.8 1,348.4 3.24 258.50 216.11 30.63 146.57
100
Table 14 (Continued)
uo Ho 9i 0* Tp P °F1 CF2 CF
127 57.6 1,008.1 1,380.1 2.71 2,063.90 1,950.24 200.58 1,619.00
151 53.0 391.5 458.6 2.27 512.20 149.97 24.15 109.53
596 64.4 104.0 106.9 1.63 15,460.70 14,041.66 1,385.54 10,572.22
811 49.6 1,001.9 1,470.8 1.76 4,061.40 1,934.68 199.05 1,570.85
243 54.1 395.7 592.8 2.57 1,524.50 1,507.80 157.22 1,142.17
193 62.4 222.3 291.2 1.43 1,716.80 1,127.40 119.94 820.68
25 29.8 633.9 774.0 2.80 4,036.10 933.10 100.90 593.63
902 74.6 2,005.8 2,758.0 2.02 258.10 122.10 21.42 96.35
25 56.7 397.2 406.1 2.11 776.20 793.40 87.21 557.93
444 39.3 241.2 270.0 1.35 904.50 665.46 74.67 481.08
298 70.9 2,012.1 2,575.5 1.91 347.70 341.67 42.94 215.87
,323' 65.6 302.6 375.8 1.39 469.30 432.43 51.83 284.37
445 89.1 1,006.5 1,398.0 1.28 1,966.10 1,467.72 153.29 1,086.37
291 56.4 1,004.2 1,098.8 1.97 26,905.40 2,690.58 273.13 1,786.69
101
Table 14 (Continued)
119 61.1 85.2 124.7 1.72
521 51.4 537.0 588.6 2.66
25 53.3 230.4 293.5 2.66
305 49.4 76.0 104.1 0.97
364 65.1 403.9 580.8 2.79
331 39.4 537.9 722.9 1.63
531 71.1 391.6 495.4 1.32
1,183 44.3 53.5 67.2 0.98
92 52.8 248.1 342.1 2.81
183 77.1 236.2 249.9 0.61
189 77.4 227.8 241.9 0.56
166 58.6 563.6 632.2 1.32
27 52.0 312.4 442.4 2.11
108 35.7 235.8 349.5 2.92
1,122.80 979.61 105.45 779.56
2,245.60 884.16 96.10 583.13
1,707.50 1,287.17 135.20 786.85
1,389.30 708.82 78.92 523.05
4,054.20 2,701.12 274.16 1,657.16
1,321.50 579.71 66.26 427.38
1,256.50 142.07 23.37 96.69
1,893.80 1,329.40 139.73 820.83
1,073.10 953.92 102.94 759.98
2,051.00 785.29 86.41 525.69
2,310.60 1,926.13 198.21 1,483.81
2,105.80 353.05 44.05 267.06
15,460.80 6,111.78 608.41 5,085.90
354.30 371.62 45.87 247.87
102
Table 14 (Continued)
Do Ho ei 0* Tp p CF1 CF2 CF
163 32.0 540.7 623.1 1.29 4,075.90 589.90 67.26 470.62
862 61.6 433.4 637.5 0.57 1,976.50 1,410.70 147.70 1,113.57
96 72.3 458.8 489.5 1.51 2,183.00 1,619.96 123.32 762.04
858 82.2 288.0 403.5 2.28 23,091.20 16,878.52 1,663.55 14,045.40
560 79.3 1(001.0 1,366.4 1.32 898.70 570.31 65.34 399.31
514 73.9 283.2 423.1 0.54 23,090.60 14,801.09 1,459.96 12,183.10
352 47.2 496.5 547.1 2.15 204.90 92.48 18.52 61.51
343 72.3 226.5 282.5 0.96 2,225.20 596.71 67.93 460.66
344 67.8 2,002.6 2,274.7 2.80 1,917.20 1,488.26 155.30 1,058.35
143 44.8 581.9 600.4 3.03 1,620.00 399.18 48.57 289.36
117 43.1 538.4 680.0 2.75 1,773.90 1,808.68 186.68 1,119.43
85 70.8 1,002.0 1,397.8 2.07 1,304.80 486.76 57.15 389.38
25 86.7 1,001.0 1,252.3 0.99 1,918.40 448.36 53.39 277.83
25 50.4 1,008.3 1,469.1 2.95 4,065.60 3,923.03 393.31 2,817.98
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Table 14 (Continued)
348 91.0 440.0 650.3 0.66
168 68.1 200.1 251.1 1.49
29 55.9 200.8 232.9 2.79
499 38.5 117.5 172.7 1.87
837 64.1 619.9 900.7 1.53
37 76.0 152.9 219.3 0.54
136 52.3 317.4 331.0 1.63
143 69.8 519.0 771.8 0.82
1,464 37.9 560.6 826.3 1.09
385 82.3 145.8 175.4 1.36
1,023 36.5 103.3 122.1 1.95
25 31.2 2,005.0 2,650.6 0.82
443 56.0 1,005.5 1,232.7 1.35
279 61.1 620.1 737.3 1.95
P CF1 CF2 CF
1,244.10 255.70 34.51 182.08
1,842.70 151.28 24.28 108.64
1,295.50 908.21 98.46 571.77
1,839.80 657.55 73.89 521.99
1,215.90 813.72 89.20 629.75
1,153.00 267.85 35.70 186.73
509.20 447.87 53.34 294.49
350.50 304.14 39.26 218.02
4,025.10 3,551.10 357.46 3,044.59
1,484.80 1,273.82 134.29 879.05
516.40 327.64 41.56 210.15
1,224.20 794.59 87.32 589.19
233.10 237.71 32.75 157.48
1,138.10 593.47 67.61 410.30
104
Table 14 (Continued)
Bo Ho 9i 0* TP p CF1 CF2 CF
27 32.4 416.7 508.0 1.74 1,408.40 1,280.62 134.95 934.23
148 21.1 140.7 145.1 2.12 595.50 338.29 42.60 222.96
271 64.5 387.3 534.5 2.63 474.30 228.65 31.86 181.77
25 64.6 104.4 143.7 2.52 11,645.20 3,459.36 348.47 2,945.19
618 43.2 2,003.0 2,812.2 2.97 771.90 708.22 78.86 593.66
323 33.5 296.0 428.0 0.73 1,662.10 1,127.41 119.94 921.99
459 53.0 164.0 220.7 1.47 829.60 811.80 89.01 537.79
846 66.3 146.0 164.6 3.01 993.00 786.13 86.49 566.95
682 83.3 405.5 455.4 1.43 467.90 166.50 25.77 105.52
30 64.0 129.5 147.4 3.01 1,097.70 265.98 35.52 167.65
128 78.4 1,000.9 1,145.0 2.62 1,021.10 244.27 33.39 148.21
67 47.4 133.4 197.7 1.94 767.70 382.94 46.98 264.43
39 64.3 152.0 198.4 3.15 4,071.80 2,574.36 261.74 1,756.91
199 69.8 456.7 600.6 1.86 1,622.20 1,362.52 142.98 881.02
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Table 14 (Continued)
°0 Ho 9i 0* TP p CF1 CF2 CF
567 54.8 2,004.9 2,758.7 0.59 1,538.60 716.85 79.70 549.62
199 73.3 320.7 451.5 1.24 1,181.10 938.29 101.40 641.49
177 82.3 246.9 319.0 1.00 248.60 79.94 17.29 48.15
255 58.8 459.5 688.3 2.71 828.50 614.14 69.64 538.70
102 55.5 221.4 229.0 1.99 4,065.30 1,352.44 141.99 912.05
25 15.4 371.3 525.4 0.91 1,671.30 169.95 26.11 110.87
134 67.2 1,004.7 1,500.0 0.54 4,032.00 323.69 41.17 221.51
25 75.3 273.5 277.9 1.76 2,025.70 1,048.43 112.20 789.50
499 55.1 411.7 605.2 0.52 1,359.10 1,080.07 115.30 913.77
93 27.9 156.1 181.9 2.17 1,778.30 427.38 51.33 308.86
518 67.5 2,009.8 2,902.2 2.05 2,108.50 1,190.95 126.17 960.34
543 37.6 199.2 297.2 1.82 255.20 174.63 26.54 126.08
60 67.6 249.5 357.8 2.04 4,075.50 1,183.27 125.41 767.99




Bo Ho 8.1 0* tp P CF1 CF2 CF
96 57.0 1,000.8 1,259.0 0.66 525.00 135.69 22.75 97.89
305 79.0 573.4 778.7 1.24 332.90 88.65 18.14 63.82
666 50.7 502.0 515.2 1.91 2,111.00 868.19 94.53 622.77
177 43.3 2,002.5 2,923.6 1.66 4,030.90 1,356.39 142.38 921.66
105 33.9 544.1 642.0 2.61 1,366.30 567.70 65.09 364.82
218 21.2 1,004.7 1,154.4 2.92 4,062.50 2,734.94 277.48 1,811.91
168 96.8 389.3 510.8 0.83 2,328.60 1,474.46 153.95 1,070.04
102 66.6 150.9 195.7 2.44 23,090.40 3,558.22 358.16 2,755.14
208 69.5 222.4 279.3 2.00 4,069.50 1,627.96 168.99 1,059.22
1,648 74.9 269.1 349.6 3.24 4,034.60 3,657.90 367.93 2,752.72
408 56.6 106.4 144.8 3.11 416.70 384.47 47.13 241.66
210 41.7 236.1 332.9 1.15 2,289.50 2,211.76 226.20 1,815.89
415 64.2 157.0 216.8 3.07 1,284.50 403.05 48.95 278.60
302 54.8 181.7 252.6 0.72 1,847.20 332.06 41.99 234.66
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Table 14 (Continued)
°0 Ho 9i 0* TP p CF1 CF2 CF
1,281 67.6 191.9 201.2 1.96 666.50 255.91 34.53 176.28
580 82.4 5*8.6 739.2 2.72 477.90 483.74 56.86 292.87
303 65.6 164.3 180.2 1.88 1,465.50 1,436.81 150.26 955.21
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